Flask Session -> Double Token

README.md

@@ -45,11 +45,17 @@
      ↓
 访问 /control → 输入 6 位数字（自动识别 TOTP / 临时账户 TOTP / Root 临时密码）
      ↓
+登录成功 → 签发 access token（前端持有）+ refresh token（httpOnly cookie）
+     ↓
 Root 临时密码 → 强制跳转 /mfa-setup 配置 MFA
 正式用户 TOTP/Passkey → 直接进入控制面板
 临时账户 TOTP → 强制跳转 /mfa-setup 配置登录方式，配置完成后临时 TOTP 立即失效
 ```
 
+**会话管理**：
+- 控制端「设置 → 踢掉当前账号的所有设备」：所有登录该账号的设备（控制端 + 显示端，含当前设备）立即下线，**所有登录用户可用**
+- Root「用户管理 → 踢掉所有用户」：所有用户的控制端与显示端全部下线（含 Root 自身），需二次验证
+
 **用户管理（仅 Root）**：
 - 管理员代注册：填写信息 → 正式账户，可随后代配置 TOTP（生成密钥+二维码）或 Passkey（注册仪式在当前浏览器完成）
 - 用户自助申请：用户在 `/register-request` 填写信息 → 管理员确认 → 生成临时账户（服务器持有临时 TOTP 密钥，管理员仅看到实时验证码）
@@ -61,8 +67,9 @@ Root 临时密码 → 强制跳转 /mfa-setup 配置 MFA
 - 登录频率限制（渐进式封禁：5次→5分钟、10次→15分钟、15次→24小时）
 - CSRF 防护（Origin/Referer 校验）
 - 敏感操作二次验证（用户管理、MFA 配置需重新确认身份）
-- 会话 Cookie HttpOnly + SameSite=Lax + Secure（HTTPS 下）
+- **双 Token 认证**：短期 access token（`Authorization: Bearer`，15 分钟）+ 长期 refresh token（httpOnly cookie，30 天滑动续期、每次刷新轮换）
-- 会话版本按用户存储：删除用户 / "踢掉所有显示端" 立即失效
+- Access token 快照会话版本：删除用户 / 踢设备 / 踢所有用户后**立即**使全部 access token 失效
+- 显示端 SSE 通过一次性短时 ticket 鉴权（EventSource 无法带自定义 header）
 - 内容安全策略（CSP）限制脚本/样式来源
 - 铃声上传仅允许音频格式+MIME 校验
 - 第三方日历数据 HTML 转义防止 XSS
@@ -225,8 +232,8 @@ location / {
 
 | 变量 | 默认值 | 说明 |
 |------|--------|------|
-| `FLASK_HTTPS` | 空 | 设为 `yes`/`true` 启用 Secure Cookie（Nginx 反代时启用） |
+| `FLASK_HTTPS` | 空 | 设为 `yes`/`true` 启用 refresh token cookie 的 Secure 属性（Nginx 反代时启用） |
-| `FLASK_SECRET_KEY` | 自动随机生成 | 固定密钥使会话跨重启保持有效 |
+| `FLASK_SECRET_KEY` | 自动随机生成 | 保留兼容；认证已由 access/refresh 双 token 承载，不再依赖 Flask session |
 | `FLASK_BIND` | `127.0.0.1` | 监听地址，Docker 部署需设为 `0.0.0.0` |
 | `FLASK_DB_PATH` | `./data.db` | 数据库文件路径，Docker 挂载数据卷时需同步修改 |
 | `FLASK_DEBUG` | 空 | 设为 `true` 开启 Flask 调试模式（**生产环境禁用**） |
@@ -241,26 +248,35 @@ location / {
 ├── requirements.txt
 ├── backend/
 │   ├── app.py              # Flask 应用工厂 + 安全配置
-│   ├── auth.py             # MFA 认证（TOTP/Passkey/恢复码/临时密码）
+│   ├── auth.py             # 双 Token 认证（TOTP/Passkey/恢复码/临时密码）
 │   ├── webauthn_mgr.py     # WebAuthn (Passkey) 注册与认证
 │   ├── jwt_util.py         # Ed25519 JWT 签名（和风天气）
-│   ├── models.py           # SQLite 数据库模型与迁移
+│   ├── models.py           # SQLite 模型、schema 版本迁移、token 管理
-│   ├── routes.py           # 全部 API 路由 + CSRF 防护
+│   ├── routes.py           # 全部 API 路由 + CSRF 防护 + SSE ticket
 │   └── *_mgr.py            # 各功能模块管理器
 └── frontend/
     ├── templates/           # HTML 模板
     └── static/
         ├── css/             # 样式
         ├── js/              # JavaScript（纯原生，无框架）
+        │   ├── token.js     # 双 Token 客户端（access 存储/刷新/401 重试/SSE ticket）
+        │   ├── control.js   # 控制端逻辑
+        │   └── display.js   # 显示端逻辑（账户时区渲染）
         └── ringtones/       # 自定义铃声
 ```
 
 ---
 
-### 数据库迁移（升级无需重写数据）
+### 数据库迁移（版本化，升级无需重写数据）
+
+数据库内置 `meta` 表记录 **schema 版本**（程序内 `DB_VERSION`，当前为 1）。每次启动时比对：
+
+| 情况 | 行为 |
+|------|------|
+| 数据库版本 == 程序版本 | 直接使用，跳过重建 |
+| 无版本字段（旧版数据库）或 数据库版本 < 程序版本 | 重建数据库并迁移（旧版单用户数据自动归属 Root (id=0)，新增字段一律用 DEFAULT 填充，`camera_config` 等已删除的表自动丢弃） |
+| 数据库版本 > 程序版本 | **报错并终止启动**（数据库比程序新，需先升级程序） |
 
-启动时会自动检测并迁移数据库：旧版单用户数据库的数据自动归属 Root (id=0)；
-新增的字段一律带 DEFAULT 并在迁移时自动填充；`camera_config` 等已删除的表自动丢弃。
 旧版 4 位 PIN 不会被迁移。运行测试：`python3 tests/test_multi_user.py`。
 
 ## 注意

backend/app.py

@@ -22,8 +22,7 @@ def create_app(db_path: str = "data.db") -> Flask:
         template_folder="../frontend/templates",
         static_folder="../frontend/static",
     )
-    # Generate a secure random key at startup.
+    # Generate a secure random key at startup (kept for compatibility).
-    # Set FLASK_SECRET_KEY env var for a fixed key (sessions survive restarts).
     app.config["SECRET_KEY"] = os.environ.get("FLASK_SECRET_KEY") or secrets.token_hex(32)
     # Defensive check: ensure key is never empty
     if not app.config["SECRET_KEY"]:
@@ -32,12 +31,8 @@ def create_app(db_path: str = "data.db") -> Flask:
     # Trust Nginx X-Forwarded-* headers (x_for=1, x_proto=1, x_host=1)
     app.wsgi_app = ProxyFix(app.wsgi_app, x_for=1, x_proto=1, x_host=1)
 
-    # Session hardening for production
+    # Dual-token auth: access token in Authorization header, refresh token in
-    https = os.environ.get("FLASK_HTTPS", "").lower() in ("1", "true", "yes")
+    # an httpOnly cookie. No Flask session cookies are used anymore.
-    app.config["SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY"] = True
-    app.config["SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE"] = "Lax"
-    app.config["SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE"] = https
-    app.config["SESSION_PERMANENT"] = False
 
     # Strict CORS: only allow same-origin requests (no wildcard for cookie auth)
     CORS(app, supports_credentials=True, origins=[])  # empty = same-origin only
@@ -45,9 +40,6 @@ def create_app(db_path: str = "data.db") -> Flask:
     # Content size limit: 5MB for uploads
     app.config["MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH"] = 5 * 1024 * 1024
 
-    # Session lifetime: 24 hours idle timeout
-    app.config["PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME"] = 86400
-
     # Global event bus
     app.event_bus = EventBus()
 

backend/auth.py

@@ -1,30 +1,38 @@
-"""MFA-based authentication: TOTP, Passkey (WebAuthn), recovery codes, temp password.
+"""Dual-token authentication: short-lived access token (Authorization header,
+validated per-request) + long-lived refresh token (httpOnly cookie, rotated
+on each refresh). TOTP / Passkey / recovery codes / temp password still drive
+the login ceremony; the result is a token pair instead of a Flask session.
 
 Multi-user support:
-- Sessions carry the authenticated `user_id` (Root = 0).
+- Every request resolves its user from the access token (`g.user_id`).
-- The unified login (6-digit code) searches every active user's TOTP secret,
+- Access tokens snapshot the user's `session_version`; bumping it (delete user,
-  then temp accounts' temp-TOTP secrets, then Root's temp password.
+  kick devices) invalidates every outstanding access token immediately.
-- Session version is per-user (stored in the users table), so deleting a user
+- Refresh tokens are stored hashed in `auth_tokens`; deleting them (logout of
-  or kicking all sessions immediately invalidates their cookies.
+  one device / kick) ends the corresponding device session.
+- Temp-account / temp-password logins get `temp=1` tokens; the user is forced
+  through MFA setup until they complete it, then a fresh non-temp pair is
+  issued.
 """
 import functools
+import os
 import secrets
 import string
 import time
-from flask import session, redirect, url_for, request, jsonify, current_app, g
+from flask import g, redirect, url_for, request, jsonify, current_app
 from backend.models import (
     get_auth_config, update_auth_config, get_temp_password, set_temp_password,
     clear_temp_password, get_recovery_codes, set_recovery_codes, has_mfa_configured,
-    get_user_session_version, user_exists, is_admin_user, get_db,
+    user_exists, is_admin_user, get_db,
+    create_auth_token, find_access_token,
+    delete_auth_token, REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL, ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL,
 )
 
-# ─── Session keys ────────────────────────────
+# ─── Token / cookie constants ────────────────
-SKEY_AUTH = "mfa_authenticated"      # bool: fully authenticated
+REFRESH_COOKIE = "refresh_token"   # httpOnly, SameSite=Lax, Secure under HTTPS
-SKEY_TEMP = "mfa_temp_pending"        # bool: logged in with temp pw / temp account, config required
+
-SKEY_VIEW = "mfa_view"                # str: "control" or "display"
+
-SKEY_REAUTH = "mfa_reauth_at"         # float: timestamp of last re-authentication
+def _https_enabled() -> bool:
-SKEY_VERSION = "mfa_session_ver"      # int: session version (for kick_all invalidation)
+    return os.environ.get("FLASK_HTTPS", "").lower() in ("1", "true", "yes")
-SKEY_USER = "user_id"                 # int: id of the authenticated user
 
 
 def _db_path(preferred: str = None) -> str:
@@ -33,44 +41,60 @@ def _db_path(preferred: str = None) -> str:
     return current_app.config.get("DB_PATH", "data.db")
 
 
-def _validate_version():
+# ─── Auth context (per-request, populated by before_request) ───
-    """If the session version is stale (kick_all / user deleted), clear the session."""
+
-    uid = session.get(SKEY_USER)
+def load_auth_context():
-    if uid is None:
+    """Parse `Authorization: Bearer <access>` and fill `g` with the auth context.
+    Runs for every request (cheap: no token → no-op)."""
+    token = _extract_bearer()
+    if not token:
         return
-    # Cache the validation result for the duration of this request.
+    row = find_access_token(token)
-    if getattr(g, "_sv_ok", False) and getattr(g, "_sv_uid", None) == uid:
+    if not row:
         return
-    ver = session.get(SKEY_VERSION)
+    g.user_id = row["user_id"]
-    if ver is None:
+    g.auth_view = row["view"]
-        return
+    g.temp_pending = bool(row["temp"])
-    stored = get_user_session_version(uid)
+    g.auth_authenticated = True
-    if stored == -1 or ver != stored:
+    g.access_token_id = row["id"]
-        clear_session()
+    g.reauth_at = row.get("reauth_at") or 0
-        return
+
-    g._sv_ok = True
+
-    g._sv_uid = uid
+def _extract_bearer() -> str | None:
+    auth = request.headers.get("Authorization", "")
+    if auth.startswith("Bearer "):
+        return auth[7:].strip()
+    return None
+
+
+def _g():
+    return g
 
 
 def is_authenticated() -> bool:
-    """Returns True if the user has completed MFA authentication."""
+    """True when the request carries a valid, non-temp access token."""
-    _validate_version()
+    try:
-    return session.get(SKEY_AUTH) is True
+        return (getattr(_g(), "auth_authenticated", False)
+                and not getattr(_g(), "temp_pending", False))
+    except Exception:
+        return False
 
 
 def is_temp_pending() -> bool:
-    """True if logged in with a temp password or temp account and must set up a login method."""
+    """True when logged in with a temp password / temp account (MFA setup required)."""
-    _validate_version()
+    try:
-    return session.get(SKEY_TEMP) is True
+        return (getattr(_g(), "auth_authenticated", False)
+                and bool(getattr(_g(), "temp_pending", False)))
+    except Exception:
+        return False
 
 
 def current_user_id() -> int | None:
-    """Return the id of the current user (session user, or scheduler thread user)."""
+    """Return the id of the current user (token user, or scheduler thread user)."""
     try:
         from flask import has_request_context
         if has_request_context():
-            _validate_version()
+            uid = getattr(_g(), "user_id", None)
-            uid = session.get(SKEY_USER)
             if uid is not None:
                 return int(uid)
     except Exception:
@@ -103,64 +127,104 @@ def is_admin() -> bool:
     return is_admin_user(uid)
 
 
-def set_authenticated(view: str = "control", user_id: int = None):
+# ─── Token issuance / refresh / revocation ───
-    if user_id is None:
+
-        user_id = session.get(SKEY_USER) or 0
+def issue_tokens(user_id: int, view: str = "control", temp: bool = False) -> dict:
-    session[SKEY_AUTH] = True
+    """Create a fresh access+refresh token pair. The refresh token must be
-    session[SKEY_TEMP] = False
+    delivered to the client via an httpOnly cookie by the caller."""
-    session[SKEY_VIEW] = view
+    access = create_auth_token(user_id, "access", view=view, temp=temp)
-    session[SKEY_USER] = user_id
+    refresh = create_auth_token(user_id, "refresh", view=view, temp=temp)
-    session[SKEY_VERSION] = get_user_session_version(user_id)
+    return {"access_token": access, "refresh_token": refresh}
-    # A fresh authentication must not inherit the temp-setup re-auth marker.
-    session.pop(SKEY_REAUTH, None)
-    session.permanent = True
 
 
-def set_temp_pending(view: str = "control", user_id: int = None):
+def set_refresh_cookie(resp, refresh: str):
-    """Mark the session as logged-in-but-must-configure (temp password / temp account)."""
+    """Attach the refresh token as an httpOnly cookie on the response."""
-    if user_id is None:
+    resp.set_cookie(
-        user_id = session.get(SKEY_USER) or 0
+        REFRESH_COOKIE, refresh,
-    session[SKEY_AUTH] = False
+        max_age=REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL,
-    session[SKEY_TEMP] = True
+        httponly=True,
-    session[SKEY_VIEW] = view
+        samesite="Lax",
-    session[SKEY_USER] = user_id
+        secure=_https_enabled(),
-    session[SKEY_VERSION] = get_user_session_version(user_id)
+        path="/",
-    session.permanent = True
+    )
 
 
-def clear_session():
+def clear_refresh_cookie(resp):
-    session.pop(SKEY_AUTH, None)
+    resp.delete_cookie(REFRESH_COOKIE, path="/")
-    session.pop(SKEY_TEMP, None)
+
-    session.pop(SKEY_VIEW, None)
+
-    session.pop(SKEY_REAUTH, None)
+def rotate_refresh(refresh_raw: str) -> dict | None:
-    session.pop(SKEY_USER, None)
+    """Validate a refresh token, revoke it and issue a fresh pair (rotation).
-    session.pop(SKEY_VERSION, None)
+    Atomic (single transaction): a replayed old token can never mint twice.
+    Returns the new {access_token, refresh_token} or None when invalid."""
+    from backend.models import rotate_refresh_token
+    return rotate_refresh_token(refresh_raw)
+
+
+def logout_current_device():
+    """Revoke this device's refresh token (from the httpOnly cookie) and also
+    the presented access token, if any (so a stolen access dies immediately)."""
+    raw = request.cookies.get(REFRESH_COOKIE)
+    if raw:
+        delete_auth_token(raw, kind="refresh")
+    acc = _extract_bearer()
+    if acc:
+        delete_auth_token(acc, kind="access")
+
+
+def load_page_context() -> bool:
+    """Authenticate a top-level page navigation via the httpOnly refresh cookie
+    (browsers cannot attach Authorization headers to navigations).
+    Fills g.user_id / g.auth_view / g.temp_pending on success.
+    Returns False when unauthenticated."""
+    raw = request.cookies.get(REFRESH_COOKIE)
+    if not raw:
+        return False
+    from backend.models import find_refresh_token
+    row = find_refresh_token(raw)
+    if not row:
+        return False
+    g.user_id = row["user_id"]
+    g.auth_view = row["view"]
+    g.temp_pending = bool(row["temp"])
+    g.page_authenticated = True
+    return True
 
 
 # ─── Re-authentication guard ─────────────────
 # Sensitive operations (user management, MFA changes) require re-confirming
-# identity within the last N seconds. TOTP-first with a Passkey fallback
+# identity within the last N seconds. The marker lives on the ACCESS TOKEN row,
-# (the fallback ceremony is handled by the routes layer).
+# so it is per-device (each device's token must re-auth independently) and
+# lost on token rotation (a fresh access token requires a fresh re-auth).
 
 _REAUTH_TTL = 300  # 5 minutes
 
 
-def require_reauth():
+def require_reauth() -> bool:
-    """Check if recent re-authentication is still valid.
+    """Check if recent re-authentication is still valid for THIS access token.
     Skips the check for temp_pending users (first-time MFA setup flow).
     """
     if is_temp_pending():
         mark_reauth()
         return True
-    last = session.get(SKEY_REAUTH)
+    try:
-    if last and (time.time() - last) < _REAUTH_TTL:
+        last = getattr(g, "reauth_at", 0) or 0
-        return True
+    except Exception:
         return False
+    return bool(last) and (time.time() - last) < _REAUTH_TTL
 
 
 def mark_reauth():
-    """Mark re-authentication as done now."""
+    """Mark re-authentication as done now for the current access token."""
-    session[SKEY_REAUTH] = time.time()
+    try:
+        from flask import g as _g
+        from backend.models import mark_token_reauth
+        mark_token_reauth(getattr(_g, "access_token_id", None))
+    except Exception as e:
+        try:
+            current_app.logger.warning(f"mark_reauth failed: {e}")
+        except Exception:
+            pass
 
 
 # ─── Decorators ──────────────────────────────
@@ -168,7 +232,7 @@ def mark_reauth():
 def _unauthorized(request):
     if request.is_json or request.path.startswith("/api/"):
         return jsonify({"error": "Unauthorized", "login_required": True}), 401
-    view_param = session.get(SKEY_VIEW, "control")
+    view_param = getattr(_g(), "auth_view", None) or "control"
     return redirect(url_for("api.login_page", next=request.path, view=view_param))
 
 

backend/models.py

@@ -13,9 +13,33 @@ Multi-user design:
 import sqlite3
 import os
 import sys
+import time
 
 
 SCHEMA = """
+-- Global schema version (single row). All new columns must carry a DEFAULT.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS meta (
+    id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT 1,
+    version INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1
+);
+
+-- Auth tokens (dual-token auth): access (short-lived, per-request) and
+-- refresh (long-lived, stored in an httpOnly cookie). Only hashes are stored.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_tokens (
+    id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    user_id INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+    token_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
+    kind TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'access' CHECK(kind IN ('access','refresh')),
+    view TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'display' CHECK(view IN ('control','display')),
+    temp INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+    session_version INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+    reauth_at INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+    created_at TEXT DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
+    expires_at INTEGER NOT NULL
+);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_auth_tokens_hash ON auth_tokens(token_hash);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_auth_tokens_user ON auth_tokens(user_id);
+
 CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users (
     id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
     remark TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
@@ -195,6 +219,7 @@ USER_DATA_TABLES = [
     "reminders", "weather_config", "weather_cache", "weather_hourly_cache",
     "weather_minutely_cache", "weather_warning_cache", "clock_config",
     "alarms", "countdowns", "display_config", "pomodoro_state",
+    "auth_tokens",
 ]
 
 
@@ -311,6 +336,7 @@ def delete_user(user_id: int, db_path: str = None):
         "weather_cache", "weather_hourly_cache", "weather_minutely_cache",
         "weather_warning_cache", "weather_config", "clock_config",
         "alarms", "countdowns", "display_config", "pomodoro_state", "auth_config",
+        "auth_tokens",
     ]
     try:
         for table in ordered:
@@ -364,7 +390,8 @@ def get_temp_totp_secret(user_id: int, db_path: str = None) -> str:
 
 def finalize_temp_account(user_id: int, db_path: str = None):
     """Convert a temp account into a formal account:
-    invalidates the temp TOTP and clears the temp flag.
+    invalidates the temp TOTP, clears the temp flag, and revokes every
+    temp=1 token (a temp refresh must never mint formal tokens afterwards).
     """
     conn = get_db(_db_path(db_path))
     conn.execute(
@@ -375,6 +402,10 @@ def finalize_temp_account(user_id: int, db_path: str = None):
         "UPDATE auth_config SET must_configure_mfa=0 WHERE user_id=?",
         (user_id,)
     )
+    conn.execute(
+        "DELETE FROM auth_tokens WHERE user_id=? AND temp=1",
+        (user_id,)
+    )
     conn.commit()
     conn.close()
 
@@ -479,6 +510,211 @@ def apply_custom_html(index: int, db_path: str = None, user_id: int = 0) -> bool
     return True
 
 
+# ─── Auth tokens (dual-token auth) ───────────
+# Access tokens are short-lived and validated on every request; refresh tokens
+# are long-lived and stored in an httpOnly cookie. Only SHA-256 hashes are
+# stored in the DB. Kicking a user/device = delete their tokens + bump the
+# user's session_version (which invalidates every outstanding access token).
+
+ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL = 15 * 60          # 15 minutes
+REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL = 30 * 24 * 3600  # 30 days (sliding, renewed on each refresh)
+
+
+def _hash_token(raw: str) -> str:
+    import hashlib
+    return hashlib.sha256(raw.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _prune_expired_tokens(conn):
+    conn.execute("DELETE FROM auth_tokens WHERE expires_at < ?", (int(time.time()),))
+
+
+def create_auth_token(user_id: int, kind: str, view: str = "display",
+                      temp: bool = False, ttl: int = None,
+                      db_path: str = None) -> str:
+    """Create an auth token row and return the raw (unhashed) token.
+    Only the SHA-256 hash is persisted."""
+    import secrets as _secrets
+    if ttl is None:
+        ttl = ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL if kind == "access" else REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL
+    raw = _secrets.token_urlsafe(48 if kind == "refresh" else 32)
+    conn = get_db(_db_path(db_path))
+    try:
+        _prune_expired_tokens(conn)
+        ver_row = conn.execute(
+            "SELECT session_version FROM users WHERE id=?", (user_id,)
+        ).fetchone()
+        ver = ver_row["session_version"] if ver_row else 0
+        conn.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO auth_tokens (user_id, token_hash, kind, view, temp, "
+            "session_version, expires_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
+            (user_id, _hash_token(raw), kind, view, 1 if temp else 0, ver,
+             int(time.time()) + ttl)
+        )
+        conn.commit()
+        return raw
+    finally:
+        conn.close()
+
+
+def _token_lookup(raw: str, kind: str, db_path: str = None) -> dict | None:
+    """Look up a token by its raw value. For access tokens the row is only
+    valid while it matches the user's current session_version (kick support).
+    Returns None when invalid/expired/user inactive/version bumped."""
+    if not raw:
+        return None
+    conn = get_db(_db_path(db_path))
+    try:
+        h = _hash_token(raw)
+        row = conn.execute(
+            "SELECT t.*, u.status AS user_status FROM auth_tokens t "
+            "JOIN users u ON u.id = t.user_id WHERE t.token_hash=? AND t.kind=?",
+            (h, kind)
+        ).fetchone()
+        if not row:
+            return None
+        if row["expires_at"] <= int(time.time()):
+            return None
+        if row["user_status"] != "active":
+            return None
+        if kind == "access" and row["session_version"] != _cur_session_version(row["user_id"], conn):
+            return None
+        return dict(row)
+    finally:
+        conn.close()
+
+
+def _cur_session_version(user_id: int, conn) -> int:
+    r = conn.execute("SELECT session_version FROM users WHERE id=?", (user_id,)).fetchone()
+    return r["session_version"] if r else -1
+
+
+def find_access_token(raw: str, db_path: str = None) -> dict | None:
+    """Validate an access token. Returns the row dict or None."""
+    return _token_lookup(raw, "access", db_path)
+
+
+def rotate_refresh_token(raw: str, db_path: str = None) -> dict | None:
+    """Atomically validate and rotate a refresh token (concurrency-safe).
+    Returns a fresh {access_token, refresh_token} pair or None. The old refresh
+    token is consumed inside a single transaction, so a replayed/concurrent
+    duplicate can never mint two valid pairs."""
+    if not raw:
+        return None
+    import secrets as _secrets
+    conn = get_db(_db_path(db_path))
+    try:
+        conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+        row = conn.execute(
+            "SELECT t.*, u.status AS user_status FROM auth_tokens t "
+            "JOIN users u ON u.id = t.user_id WHERE t.token_hash=? AND t.kind='refresh'",
+            (_hash_token(raw),)
+        ).fetchone()
+        if (not row or row["expires_at"] <= int(time.time())
+                or row["user_status"] != "active"):
+            conn.rollback()
+            return None
+        cur = conn.execute("DELETE FROM auth_tokens WHERE id=?", (row["id"],))
+        if cur.rowcount == 0:
+            conn.rollback()
+            return None
+        now = int(time.time())
+        acc_raw = _secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+        ref_raw = _secrets.token_urlsafe(48)
+        ver = row["session_version"]
+        conn.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO auth_tokens (user_id, token_hash, kind, view, temp, "
+            "session_version, expires_at) VALUES (?, ?, 'access', ?, ?, ?, ?)",
+            (row["user_id"], _hash_token(acc_raw), row["view"], row["temp"],
+             ver, now + ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL)
+        )
+        conn.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO auth_tokens (user_id, token_hash, kind, view, temp, "
+            "session_version, expires_at) VALUES (?, ?, 'refresh', ?, ?, ?, ?)",
+            (row["user_id"], _hash_token(ref_raw), row["view"], row["temp"],
+             ver, now + REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL)
+        )
+        conn.commit()
+        return {"access_token": acc_raw, "refresh_token": ref_raw}
+    finally:
+        conn.close()
+
+
+def find_refresh_token(raw: str, db_path: str = None) -> dict | None:
+    """Validate a refresh token (status check only; version is not compared
+    here because a refresh token belongs to one device and is deleted on
+    kick, not merely invalidated)."""
+    if not raw:
+        return None
+    conn = get_db(_db_path(db_path))
+    try:
+        h = _hash_token(raw)
+        row = conn.execute(
+            "SELECT t.*, u.status AS user_status FROM auth_tokens t "
+            "JOIN users u ON u.id = t.user_id WHERE t.token_hash=? AND t.kind='refresh'",
+            (h,)
+        ).fetchone()
+        if not row:
+            return None
+        if row["expires_at"] <= int(time.time()):
+            return None
+        if row["user_status"] != "active":
+            return None
+        return dict(row)
+    finally:
+        conn.close()
+
+
+def mark_token_reauth(token_row_id: int, db_path: str = None):
+    """Stamp the current access token row as re-authenticated (per-device)."""
+    if not token_row_id:
+        return
+    conn = get_db(_db_path(db_path))
+    try:
+        conn.execute("UPDATE auth_tokens SET reauth_at=? WHERE id=?",
+                     (int(time.time()), token_row_id))
+        conn.commit()
+    finally:
+        conn.close()
+
+
+def delete_auth_token(raw: str, kind: str = None, db_path: str = None):
+    """Delete a single token row by raw value (logout of one device)."""
+    if not raw:
+        return
+    conn = get_db(_db_path(db_path))
+    try:
+        h = _hash_token(raw)
+        if kind:
+            conn.execute("DELETE FROM auth_tokens WHERE token_hash=? AND kind=?", (h, kind))
+        else:
+            conn.execute("DELETE FROM auth_tokens WHERE token_hash=?", (h,))
+        conn.commit()
+    finally:
+        conn.close()
+
+
+def revoke_user_tokens(user_id: int, db_path: str = None):
+    """Delete every token of a user (kick all devices of one account).
+    Callers should also bump_user_session_version() to invalidate access tokens."""
+    conn = get_db(_db_path(db_path))
+    try:
+        conn.execute("DELETE FROM auth_tokens WHERE user_id=?", (user_id,))
+        conn.commit()
+    finally:
+        conn.close()
+
+
+def revoke_all_tokens(db_path: str = None):
+    """Delete every token of every user (Root: kick all users)."""
+    conn = get_db(_db_path(db_path))
+    try:
+        conn.execute("DELETE FROM auth_tokens")
+        conn.commit()
+    finally:
+        conn.close()
+
+
 # ─── Auth / MFA helpers (per user) ──────────
 
 def get_auth_config(db_path: str = None, user_id: int = 0) -> dict:
@@ -598,6 +834,9 @@ def _ensure_defaults(conn):
     import secrets
     import string
 
+    # Schema-version row (single row, id=1).
+    conn.execute("INSERT OR IGNORE INTO meta (id, version) VALUES (1, ?)", (DB_VERSION,))
+
     # Root user (id 0)
     root = conn.execute("SELECT id FROM users WHERE id=0").fetchone()
     if root is None:
@@ -659,6 +898,10 @@ def _ensure_defaults(conn):
 # Stores passwords that were just generated, for the startup script to print.
 _EMITTED_PASSWORDS: list = []
 
+# Current schema version supported by this program. Bump it whenever the
+# SCHEMA changes so existing databases get rebuilt+migrated on next start.
+DB_VERSION = 1
+
 
 def _table_columns(conn, table_name):
     return [row["name"] for row in conn.execute(f"PRAGMA table_info({table_name})")]
@@ -694,17 +937,44 @@ def _migrate_auth_config(conn_new, conn_old):
 
 
 def init_db(db_path: str = "data.db"):
-    """Initialize the database.
+    """Initialize the database with schema-version aware migration.
 
     - No database file: create it from the latest SCHEMA and create Root.
-    - Existing database: rebuild it from the latest SCHEMA, migrate compatible
+    - Existing database:
-      data (legacy single-user data becomes Root's), fill missing columns with
+        * no `meta.version` (legacy DB)  → rebuild + migrate compatible data
-      SCHEMA defaults, then replace the old file (keeping a backup).
+        * DB version <  DB_VERSION       → rebuild + migrate
+        * DB version == DB_VERSION       → use as-is (fast path)
+        * DB version >  DB_VERSION       → abort with an error (DB is newer
+                                            than this program)
+
+    Rebuild copies compatible data (legacy single-user data becomes Root's)
+    and fills missing columns with SCHEMA defaults.
     """
     if not os.path.exists(db_path):
         conn = get_db(db_path)
         conn.executescript(SCHEMA)
         _ensure_defaults(conn)
+        conn.execute("UPDATE meta SET version=? WHERE id=1", (DB_VERSION,))
+        conn.commit()
+        conn.close()
+        return
+
+    conn_probe = get_db(db_path)
+    old_version = _read_db_version(conn_probe)
+    conn_probe.close()
+
+    if old_version is not None and old_version > DB_VERSION:
+        raise SystemExit(
+            f"[FATAL] 数据库 schema 版本 (v{old_version}) 高于当前程序支持的版本 "
+            f"(v{DB_VERSION})。请先升级程序，或删除/降级数据库后再启动。"
+        )
+
+    if old_version is not None and old_version == DB_VERSION:
+        # Same version — no rebuild needed. Just ensure defaults exist.
+        conn = get_db(db_path)
+        _ensure_defaults(conn)
+        conn.execute("INSERT OR IGNORE INTO meta (id, version) VALUES (1, ?)", (DB_VERSION,))
+        conn.commit()
         conn.close()
         return
 
@@ -764,6 +1034,10 @@ def init_db(db_path: str = "data.db"):
     # Now fill defaults for any tables that are still empty + Root bootstrap.
     _ensure_defaults(conn_new)
 
+    # Stamp the migrated database with the program's schema version.
+    conn_new.execute("UPDATE meta SET version=? WHERE id=1", (DB_VERSION,))
+    conn_new.commit()
+
     conn_old.close()
     conn_new.close()
 
@@ -772,3 +1046,14 @@ def init_db(db_path: str = "data.db"):
         os.remove(backup_path)
     os.rename(db_path, backup_path)
     os.rename(new_db_path, db_path)
+
+
+def _read_db_version(conn) -> int | None:
+    """Read the schema version from the `meta` table.
+    Returns None when the DB is legacy (no meta table / no version column).
+    """
+    try:
+        row = conn.execute("SELECT version FROM meta WHERE id=1").fetchone()
+        return int(row["version"]) if row else None
+    except Exception:
+        return None

backend/routes.py

@@ -18,16 +18,17 @@ from datetime import datetime
 from flask import (
     Blueprint, request, jsonify, Response,
     render_template, current_app, stream_with_context,
-    session, redirect, url_for,
+    g, redirect, url_for,
 )
 from backend import calendar_mgr, weather_mgr, alarm_mgr, pomodoro_mgr, countdown_mgr
 from backend.auth import (
     login_required, login_or_temp_required, display_login_required, admin_required,
     is_authenticated, is_temp_pending, is_admin, current_user_id,
-    set_authenticated, set_temp_pending, clear_session,
     verify_login, verify_totp, verify_recovery_code,
     check_rate_limit, record_failure, record_success,
     require_reauth, mark_reauth, generate_recovery_codes, generate_temp_password,
+    load_auth_context, issue_tokens, set_refresh_cookie, clear_refresh_cookie,
+    rotate_refresh, logout_current_device, load_page_context, REFRESH_COOKIE,
 )
 from backend.models import (
     get_auth_config, update_auth_config, set_temp_password, clear_temp_password,
@@ -37,6 +38,7 @@ from backend.models import (
     get_users, get_user, create_user, update_user, delete_user,
     is_temp_account, is_admin_user, finalize_temp_account,
     find_user_by_credential_id, bump_all_session_versions,
+    bump_user_session_version, revoke_user_tokens, revoke_all_tokens,
 )
 from backend.webauthn_mgr import (
     begin_registration, complete_registration,
@@ -53,9 +55,15 @@ def _cur() -> int:
 
 
 # ════════════════════════════════════════════
-#              CSRF / Origin Check
+#           AUTH CONTEXT / CSRF
 # ════════════════════════════════════════════
 
+@api.before_request
+def _load_token():
+    """Resolve the access token (Authorization header) into g.user_id / view / temp."""
+    load_auth_context()
+
+
 @api.before_request
 def _check_origin():
     """Protect state-changing requests against CSRF by verifying Origin/Referer.
@@ -199,6 +207,8 @@ def api_login():
     data = request.get_json() or {}
     code = data.get("code", "")
     view = data.get("view", "control")
+    if view not in ("control", "display"):
+        view = "control"  # 未认证端点：非法值降级，避免触发 DB CHECK 约束 500
 
     result = verify_login(code)
     if result is None:
@@ -213,21 +223,26 @@ def api_login():
         if temp_account:
             # Temp account: server-held temp TOTP matched → force registration flow.
             record_success()
-            set_temp_pending(view, uid)
+            tokens = issue_tokens(uid, view=view, temp=True)
+            resp["access_token"] = tokens["access_token"]
             resp["must_configure_mfa"] = True
         else:
             cfg = get_auth_config(user_id=uid)
             if not cfg.get("totp_enabled"):
                 return jsonify({"error": "TOTP 尚未启用"}), 403
             record_success()
-            set_authenticated(view, uid)
+            tokens = issue_tokens(uid, view=view)
+            resp["access_token"] = tokens["access_token"]
 
     else:  # temp_password (Root initial bootstrap)
         record_success()
-        set_temp_pending(view, uid)
+        tokens = issue_tokens(uid, view=view, temp=True)
+        resp["access_token"] = tokens["access_token"]
         resp["must_configure_mfa"] = True
 
-    return jsonify(resp)
+    response = jsonify(resp)
+    set_refresh_cookie(response, tokens["refresh_token"])
+    return response
 
 
 # ─── Recovery Code Login ─────────────────────
@@ -242,12 +257,16 @@ def api_login_recovery():
     data = request.get_json() or {}
     code = data.get("code", "")
     view = data.get("view", "control")
+    if view not in ("control", "display"):
+        view = "control"
 
     uid = verify_recovery_code(code)
     if uid is not None:
         record_success()
-        set_authenticated(view, uid)
+        tokens = issue_tokens(uid, view=view)
-        return jsonify({"ok": True})
+        response = jsonify({"ok": True, "access_token": tokens["access_token"]})
+        set_refresh_cookie(response, tokens["refresh_token"])
+        return response
 
     record_failure()
     return jsonify({"error": "恢复码错误或已使用"}), 401
@@ -356,6 +375,8 @@ def api_webauthn_login_complete():
 
     data = request.get_json() or {}
     view = data.get("view", "control")
+    if view not in ("control", "display"):
+        view = "control"
     credential = data.get("credential", {})
     credential_b64 = credential.get("id", "")
 
@@ -392,8 +413,10 @@ def api_webauthn_login_complete():
             record_failure()
             return jsonify({"error": "Passkey 凭证不匹配"}), 401
         record_success()
-        set_authenticated(view, uid)
+        tokens = issue_tokens(uid, view=view)
-        return jsonify({"ok": True})
+        response = jsonify({"ok": True, "access_token": tokens["access_token"]})
+        set_refresh_cookie(response, tokens["refresh_token"])
+        return response
     except ValueError as e:
         record_failure()
         return jsonify({"error": str(e)}), 401
@@ -401,12 +424,36 @@ def api_webauthn_login_complete():
         return jsonify({"error": f"Passkey 验证失败: {e}"}), 500
 
 
-# ─── Logout ──────────────────────────────────
+# ─── Refresh / Logout ───────────────────────
+
+@api.route("/api/auth/refresh", methods=["POST"])
+def api_refresh():
+    """Exchange the httpOnly refresh cookie for a fresh access+refresh pair.
+    The refresh token is rotated: the old one is consumed immediately.
+    CSRF: not exempted from the Origin/Referer check (cookie-authenticated).
+    """
+    raw = request.cookies.get(REFRESH_COOKIE)
+    if not raw:
+        return jsonify({"error": "Unauthorized", "login_required": True}), 401
+    tokens = rotate_refresh(raw)
+    if not tokens:
+        response = jsonify({"error": "Unauthorized", "login_required": True})
+        clear_refresh_cookie(response)
+        return response, 401
+    response = jsonify({"ok": True, "access_token": tokens["access_token"]})
+    set_refresh_cookie(response, tokens["refresh_token"])
+    return response
+
 
 @api.route("/api/auth/logout", methods=["POST"])
 def api_logout():
-    clear_session()
+    """Revoke this device's refresh token and clear its cookie.
-    return jsonify({"ok": True})
+    Other devices of the same account are unaffected.
+    """
+    logout_current_device()
+    response = jsonify({"ok": True})
+    clear_refresh_cookie(response)
+    return response
 
 
 # ─── Auth Status ─────────────────────────────
@@ -484,9 +531,11 @@ def api_register_request():
 
 @api.route("/mfa-setup")
 def mfa_setup_page():
-    """MFA configuration page. Shown after temp-password / temp-account login."""
+    """MFA configuration page. Shown after temp-password / temp-account login.
-    if not is_temp_pending() and not is_authenticated():
+    Authenticated via the httpOnly refresh cookie (page navigation).
-        return redirect(url_for("api.login_page", next="/mfa-setup"))
+    """
+    if not load_page_context():
+        return redirect(url_for("api.login_page", next="/mfa-setup", view="control"))
     return render_template("mfa_setup.html")
 
 
@@ -532,8 +581,12 @@ def api_webauthn_register_complete():
         if is_temp_account(uid):
             finalize_temp_account(uid)
             finalized = True
-            # The user proved access to the account — mark the session authenticated.
+            # The user proved access to the account — issue a formal token pair.
-            set_authenticated(session.get("mfa_view", "control"), uid)
+            tokens = issue_tokens(uid, view=getattr(g, "auth_view", "control"))
+            response = jsonify({"ok": True, "finalized": True,
+                                "access_token": tokens["access_token"]})
+            set_refresh_cookie(response, tokens["refresh_token"])
+            return response
         return jsonify({"ok": True, "finalized": finalized})
     except ValueError as e:
         return jsonify({"error": str(e)}), 400
@@ -602,13 +655,19 @@ def api_totp_verify():
         if is_temp_account(uid):
             finalize_temp_account(uid)
             finalized = True
-            set_authenticated(session.get("mfa_view", "control"), uid)
 
-        return jsonify({
+        resp = {
             "ok": True,
             "recovery_codes": get_recovery_codes(user_id=uid),
             "finalized": finalized,
-        })
+        }
+        if finalized:
+            tokens = issue_tokens(uid, view=getattr(g, "auth_view", "control"))
+            resp["access_token"] = tokens["access_token"]
+            response = jsonify(resp)
+            set_refresh_cookie(response, tokens["refresh_token"])
+            return response
+        return jsonify(resp)
 
     return jsonify({"error": "验证码错误，请重试"}), 400
 
@@ -631,8 +690,10 @@ def api_mfa_complete():
         finalize_temp_account(uid)
     clear_temp_password(user_id=uid)
     update_auth_config(uid, must_configure_mfa=0)
-    set_authenticated(session.get("mfa_view", "control"), uid)
+    tokens = issue_tokens(uid, view=getattr(g, "auth_view", "control"))
-    return jsonify({"ok": True})
+    response = jsonify({"ok": True, "access_token": tokens["access_token"]})
+    set_refresh_cookie(response, tokens["refresh_token"])
+    return response
 
 
 # ─── Recovery Codes ──────────────────────────
@@ -977,6 +1038,20 @@ def admin_provision_passkey_complete(user_id):
         return jsonify({"error": f"Passkey 注册失败: {e}"}), 500
 
 
+@api.route("/api/admin/kick_all_users", methods=["POST"])
+@admin_required
+def admin_kick_all_users():
+    """Root: kick EVERY user's control + display devices. All sessions end
+    immediately (including Root's own devices). High-risk → re-auth required.
+    """
+    if not require_reauth():
+        return jsonify({"error": "需要重新验证身份", "reauth_required": True}), 403
+    bump_all_session_versions()   # invalidates every access token
+    revoke_all_tokens()           # invalidates every refresh token
+    current_app.event_bus.publish("kick_all", {"reason": "admin_kick_all"})
+    return jsonify({"ok": True})
+
+
 # ════════════════════════════════════════════
 #              DISPLAY PAGES
 # ════════════════════════════════════════════
@@ -984,11 +1059,13 @@ def admin_provision_passkey_complete(user_id):
 @api.route("/")
 @api.route("/index")
 def display_page():
+    # 页面导航无法发送 Authorization header → 用 refresh cookie 鉴权。
+    # custom 模式同样需要登录（避免匿名访问泄露账户自定义 HTML）。
+    if not load_page_context():
+        return redirect(url_for("api.login_page", next=request.path))
     cfg = get_display_config(user_id=_cur())
     if cfg.get("mode") == "custom":
         return render_template("display_custom.html", custom_html=cfg.get("custom_html", ""))
-    if not is_authenticated() and not is_temp_pending():
-        return redirect(url_for("api.login_page", next=request.path))
     return render_template("display.html")
 
 
@@ -997,8 +1074,13 @@ def display_page():
 # ════════════════════════════════════════════
 
 @api.route("/control")
-@login_required
 def control_page():
+    """Control panel. Page navigation authenticates via the refresh cookie;
+    temp-pending users are sent to MFA setup."""
+    if not load_page_context():
+        return redirect(url_for("api.login_page", next="/control", view="control"))
+    if getattr(g, "temp_pending", False):
+        return redirect(url_for("api.mfa_setup_page"))
     return render_template("control.html")
 
 
@@ -1006,12 +1088,49 @@ def control_page():
 #             DISPLAY / SSE / STATE
 # ════════════════════════════════════════════
 
+# One-time, short-lived tickets used to open the SSE stream (EventSource
+# cannot send Authorization headers). The ticket is consumed on connect.
+_SSE_TICKETS: dict = {}  # ticket -> {"user_id": int, "view": str, "expires": float}
+_SSE_TICKET_TTL = 60
+
+
+def _clean_sse_tickets():
+    now = _time.time()
+    expired = [k for k, v in _SSE_TICKETS.items() if v["expires"] < now]
+    for k in expired:
+        _SSE_TICKETS.pop(k, None)
+
+
+@api.route("/api/events/ticket", methods=["POST"])
+@display_login_required
+def sse_ticket():
+    """Issue a one-time ticket for opening the SSE stream."""
+    _clean_sse_tickets()
+    from backend.models import get_user_session_version
+    ticket = secrets.token_urlsafe(24)
+    _SSE_TICKETS[ticket] = {
+        "user_id": _cur(),
+        "view": getattr(g, "auth_view", "display"),
+        "session_version": get_user_session_version(_cur()),
+        "expires": _time.time() + _SSE_TICKET_TTL,
+    }
+    return jsonify({"ticket": ticket}), 201
+
+
 @api.route("/api/events")
 def sse_stream():
-    """Server-Sent Events for real-time updates (scoped to the current user)."""
+    """Server-Sent Events for real-time updates (scoped to the current user).
-    if not is_authenticated() and not is_temp_pending():
+    Authenticated via a one-time ticket from /api/events/ticket.
+    """
+    ticket = request.args.get("ticket", "")
+    entry = _SSE_TICKETS.pop(ticket, None) if ticket else None
+    if not entry or entry["expires"] < _time.time():
         return jsonify({"error": "Unauthorized", "login_required": True}), 401
-    uid = _cur()
+    # A ticket is void once the user was kicked / deleted (version bumped).
+    from backend.models import get_user_session_version
+    if get_user_session_version(entry["user_id"]) != entry.get("session_version"):
+        return jsonify({"error": "Unauthorized", "login_required": True}), 401
+    uid = entry["user_id"]
 
     def generate():
         q = current_app.event_bus.subscribe(user_id=uid)
@@ -1055,6 +1174,7 @@ def get_display_state():
     update_schedule = weather_mgr.get_next_update_times(user_id=uid)
     minutely = weather_mgr.get_cached_minutely(user_id=uid)
     warnings = weather_mgr.get_cached_warnings(user_id=uid)
+    from backend.time_util import get_tz_str
 
     return jsonify({
         "events": events,
@@ -1067,6 +1187,7 @@ def get_display_state():
         "update_schedule": update_schedule,
         "minutely": minutely,
         "warnings": warnings,
+        "timezone": get_tz_str(),
     })
 
 
@@ -1133,13 +1254,15 @@ def force_refresh_display():
 
 
 @api.route("/api/display/kick_all", methods=["POST"])
-@admin_required
+@login_required
-def kick_all_displays():
+def kick_own_devices():
-    """Kick ALL sessions (including all users) by bumping every user's version.
+    """Kick every device logged into the CURRENT account — control AND display
-    Old session cookies become invalid immediately. Also broadcasts SSE.
+    devices, including this control device itself. All sessions end immediately.
     """
-    bump_all_session_versions()
+    uid = _cur()
-    current_app.event_bus.publish("kick_all", {})
+    bump_user_session_version(uid)   # invalidates every access token of this user
+    revoke_user_tokens(uid)          # invalidates every refresh token of this user
+    current_app.event_bus.publish("kick_all", {"reason": "self_kick"}, user_id=uid)
     return jsonify({"ok": True})
 
 

backend/time_util.py

@@ -41,11 +41,11 @@ def get_thread_user():
 
 
 def _ctx_user_id():
-    """Resolve the current user id: request session first, then thread-local."""
+    """Resolve the current user id: request auth context first, then thread-local."""
     try:
-        from flask import has_request_context, session
+        from flask import has_request_context, g
         if has_request_context():
-            uid = session.get("user_id")
+            uid = getattr(g, "user_id", None)
             if uid is not None:
                 return int(uid)
     except Exception:

backend/webauthn_mgr.py

@@ -155,10 +155,10 @@ def complete_registration(request, credential: dict) -> dict:
     expected_challenge = _REGISTRATION_CHALLENGES.pop(challenge_key, None)
     if not expected_challenge:
         # Self-registration fallback: the browser may not echo the user handle,
-        # so resolve the target from the session user.
+        # so resolve the target from the authenticated request context.
         try:
-            from flask import session
+            from backend.auth import current_user_id
-            uid = session.get("user_id")
+            uid = current_user_id()
             if uid is not None:
                 challenge_key = f"reg_{uid}"
                 expected_challenge = _REGISTRATION_CHALLENGES.pop(challenge_key, None)

frontend/static/js/control.js

@@ -16,29 +16,10 @@
   });
 
   // ─── Helpers ──────────────────────────────
+  // 统一请求封装：自动附加 Authorization: Bearer <access>，401 时自动刷新并重试，
+  // 刷新失败则清空 token 并跳转登录页（见 token.js）。
   function api(method, url, data, callback) {
-    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    Auth.request(method, url, data, callback);
-    xhr.open(method, url);
-    if (data && !(data instanceof FormData)) {
-      xhr.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');
-    }
-    xhr.onload = function () {
-      if (xhr.status === 401) {
-        var res = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText || '{}');
-        if (res.login_required) {
-          location.href = '/login?view=control&next=' + encodeURIComponent(location.pathname + location.search);
-          return;
-        }
-      }
-      if (callback) callback(JSON.parse(xhr.responseText || '{}'));
-    };
-    if (data instanceof FormData) {
-      xhr.send(data);
-    } else if (data) {
-      xhr.send(JSON.stringify(data));
-    } else {
-      xhr.send();
-    }
   }
 
   // HTML escape for untrusted data — prevents XSS in innerHTML
@@ -542,9 +523,12 @@
 
   $('kick-all-btn').addEventListener('click', function () {
     var msg = $('mode-msg');
+    showConfirm('踢掉当前账号的所有设备', '将立即下线本账号的全部设备（含当前控制端），确定？', function () {
+      msg.textContent = '正在下线全部设备...';
       api('POST', '/api/display/kick_all', null, function (res) {
         if (res.ok) {
-        msg.textContent = '已踢掉所有显示端';
+          // 当前设备也会被踢下线：由 401 → refresh 失败 → 跳转登录页完成
+          msg.textContent = '已下线本账号全部设备，即将跳转登录页';
           msg.style.color = '#2e7d32';
         } else {
           msg.textContent = res.error || '操作失败';
@@ -552,6 +536,7 @@
         }
       });
     });
+  });
 
   // ─── Timezone ──────────────────────────────
   function loadTimezone() {
@@ -579,7 +564,7 @@
 
   // ─── Logout ────────────────────────────────
   $('logout-btn').addEventListener('click', function () {
-    api('POST', '/api/auth/logout', null, function () {
+    Auth.logout(function () {
       location.href = '/login?view=control';
     });
   });
@@ -1369,6 +1354,24 @@
 
   $('user-refresh-btn').addEventListener('click', loadUsers);
 
+  // Root: kick every user's devices (control + display, all accounts)
+  var kickAllUsersBtn = $('kick-all-users-btn');
+  if (kickAllUsersBtn) {
+    kickAllUsersBtn.addEventListener('click', function () {
+      showConfirm('踢掉所有用户', '所有用户的控制端与显示端将立即全部下线（包含当前设备），确定？', function () {
+        _reauthThen(function () {
+          api('POST', '/api/admin/kick_all_users', null, function (res) {
+            if (res.ok) {
+              toast('已踢掉所有用户，即将下线');
+            } else {
+              toast(res.error || '操作失败');
+            }
+          });
+        });
+      });
+    });
+  }
+
   // ─── Init ─────────────────────────────────
   loadGroups();
   updateEventGroupSelects();

frontend/static/js/display.js

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
     update_schedule: {},
     _cdModalMode: false, // true = countdown modal, false = alarm modal
     _editingCountdown: null,
+    timezone: 'Asia/Shanghai', // 账户独立时区（来自 /api/display/state）
   };
 
   // ─── DOM refs ─────────────────────────────
@@ -48,6 +49,48 @@
       .replace(/"/g, '"').replace(/'/g, ''');
   }
 
+  // ─── 账户时区时间 ─────────────────────────
+  // 后端所有时间字符串均为账户配置时区的本地时间；显示端时钟与日期判断
+  // 也必须用该时区，而不是设备本地时间（设备时区可能与账户设置不一致）。
+  function _pad2(n) { return String(n).padStart(2, '0'); }
+
+  function _tzNow() {
+    var tz = state.timezone || 'Asia/Shanghai';
+    var out = { y: 1970, mo: 1, d: 1, h: 0, mi: 0, s: 0, wd: 0 };
+    try {
+      var parts = new Intl.DateTimeFormat('en-US', {
+        timeZone: tz,
+        year: 'numeric', month: '2-digit', day: '2-digit',
+        hour: '2-digit', minute: '2-digit', second: '2-digit',
+        hourCycle: 'h23', weekday: 'short'
+      }).formatToParts(new Date());
+      var wdMap = { Sun: 0, Mon: 1, Tue: 2, Wed: 3, Thu: 4, Fri: 5, Sat: 6 };
+      parts.forEach(function (p) {
+        switch (p.type) {
+          case 'year': out.y = parseInt(p.value, 10); break;
+          case 'month': out.mo = parseInt(p.value, 10); break;   // 1-12
+          case 'day': out.d = parseInt(p.value, 10); break;
+          case 'hour': out.h = parseInt(p.value, 10); break;
+          case 'minute': out.mi = parseInt(p.value, 10); break;
+          case 'second': out.s = parseInt(p.value, 10); break;
+          case 'weekday': out.wd = wdMap[p.value] || 0; break;
+        }
+      });
+    } catch (e) {
+      var l = new Date();
+      out = { y: l.getFullYear(), mo: l.getMonth() + 1, d: l.getDate(),
+              h: l.getHours(), mi: l.getMinutes(), s: l.getSeconds(), wd: l.getDay() };
+    }
+    return out;
+  }
+
+  // 生成 "YYYYMMDDTHHMMSS" 比较键（与后端本地时间字符串可比）
+  function _nowLocalKey() {
+    var n = _tzNow();
+    return String(n.y) + _pad2(n.mo) + _pad2(n.d) + 'T' +
+      _pad2(n.h) + _pad2(n.mi) + _pad2(n.s);
+  }
+
   // ─── Panel switching ──────────────────────
   function switchPanel(name) {
     if (state.alarmActive && name !== 'alarm') return; // lock during alarm
@@ -74,18 +117,8 @@
 
   // ─── Data fetching ────────────────────────
   function fetchState() {
-    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    Auth.request('GET', '/api/display/state', null, function (data, status) {
-    xhr.open('GET', '/api/display/state');
+      if (status !== 200) return;
-    xhr.onload = function () {
-      if (xhr.status === 401) {
-        var res = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText || '{}');
-        if (res.login_required) {
-          location.href = '/login?next=' + encodeURIComponent(location.pathname + location.search);
-          return;
-        }
-      }
-      if (xhr.status === 200) {
-        var data = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText);
       state.weather = data.weather || {};
       state.hourly = data.hourly || [];
       state.events = data.events || [];
@@ -95,15 +128,25 @@
       state.minutely = data.minutely || null;
       state.warnings = data.warnings || null;
       state.groups = data.groups || [];
+      state.timezone = data.timezone || state.timezone || 'Asia/Shanghai';
       renderAll();
-      }
+    });
-    };
-    xhr.send();
   }
 
   // ─── SSE for real-time events ─────────────
   function connectSSE() {
-    var es = new EventSource('/api/events');
+    // EventSource 不能带 Authorization header → 先换一次性 ticket
+    Auth.request('POST', '/api/events/ticket', null, function (res, status) {
+      if (status !== 201 || !res.ticket) {
+        setTimeout(connectSSE, 5000);
+        return;
+      }
+      openSSE('/api/events?ticket=' + encodeURIComponent(res.ticket));
+    });
+  }
+
+  function openSSE(url) {
+    var es = new EventSource(url);
     es.onmessage = function (e) {
       try {
         var msg = JSON.parse(e.data);
@@ -112,24 +155,19 @@
     };
     es.onerror = function () {
       es.close();
+      clearInterval(state._sseGuard);
       setTimeout(connectSSE, 5000);
     };
     // SSE doesn't give us status codes; if auth fails the browser will error-loop.
     // We add a small guard: if we get no messages for 30s, try a normal fetch to check auth.
     state._sseGuard = setInterval(function () {
-      var g = new XMLHttpRequest();
+      Auth.request('GET', '/api/display/state', null, function (data, st) {
-      g.open('GET', '/api/display/state');
+        if (st === 401) {
-      g.onload = function () {
-        if (g.status === 401) {
-          var res = JSON.parse(g.responseText || '{}');
-          if (res.login_required) {
           es.close();
           clearInterval(state._sseGuard);
           location.href = '/login?next=' + encodeURIComponent(location.pathname + location.search);
         }
-        }
+      });
-      };
-      g.send();
     }, 30000);
   }
 
@@ -175,12 +213,9 @@
       // 控制端修改了主题 → 立即刷新生效（ThemeBridge 带平滑过渡动画）
       if (window.ThemeBridge) ThemeBridge.fetch();
     } else if (msg.type === 'kick_all') {
-      var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+      Auth.logout(function () {
-      xhr.open('POST', '/api/auth/logout');
-      xhr.onload = function () {
         location.href = '/login?next=' + encodeURIComponent(location.pathname + location.search);
-      };
+      });
-      xhr.send();
     }
   }
 
@@ -401,20 +436,9 @@
 
   // ─── Alarm CRUD ───────────────────────────
   function apiJson(method, url, data, callback) {
-    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    Auth.request(method, url, data, function (res, status) {
-    xhr.open(method, url);
+      if (callback) callback(res, status);
-    if (data) { xhr.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json'); }
+    });
-    xhr.onload = function () {
-      if (xhr.status === 401) {
-        var res = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText || '{}');
-        if (res.login_required) {
-          location.href = '/login?next=' + encodeURIComponent(location.pathname + location.search);
-          return;
-        }
-      }
-      if (callback) callback(JSON.parse(xhr.responseText || '{}'));
-    };
-    xhr.send(data ? JSON.stringify(data) : null);
   }
 
   function deleteAlarm(id) {
@@ -841,12 +865,9 @@
   var lockBtn = $('lock-btn');
   if (lockBtn) {
     lockBtn.addEventListener('click', function () {
-      var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+      Auth.logout(function () {
-      xhr.open('POST', '/api/auth/logout');
-      xhr.onload = function () {
         location.href = '/login?next=' + encodeURIComponent(location.pathname + location.search);
-      };
+      });
-      xhr.send();
     });
   }
 
@@ -943,34 +964,19 @@
 
   // ─── Pomodoro controls (reuse /control endpoints) ─────────────
   function pomodoroApi(action) {
-    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    Auth.request('POST', '/api/pomodoro/' + action, null, function () {
-    xhr.open('POST', '/api/pomodoro/' + action);
-    xhr.onload = function () {
-      if (xhr.status === 401) {
-        var res = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText || '{}');
-        if (res.login_required) {
-          location.href = '/login?next=' + encodeURIComponent(location.pathname + location.search);
-          return;
-        }
-      }
       fetchState();
-    };
+    });
-    xhr.send();
   }
 
   function fetchPomodoro() {
-    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    Auth.request('GET', '/api/pomodoro', null, function (data, status) {
-    xhr.open('GET', '/api/pomodoro');
+      if (status === 200) {
-    xhr.onload = function () {
+        state.pomodoro = data || {};
-      if (xhr.status === 200) {
-        try {
-          state.pomodoro = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText);
         renderPomodoro();
         renderPomodoroCard();
-        } catch (_) {}
       }
-    };
+    });
-    xhr.send();
   }
 
   // Card pomodoro buttons (in sidebar card, not the panel)
@@ -1004,10 +1010,8 @@
   }
 
   function renderTimeCard() {
-    var now = new Date();
+    var n = _tzNow();
-    var h = String(now.getHours()).padStart(2, '0');
+    $('time-value').textContent = _pad2(n.h) + ':' + _pad2(n.mi);
-    var m = String(now.getMinutes()).padStart(2, '0');
-    $('time-value').textContent = h + ':' + m;
   }
 
   function renderWeatherCard() {
@@ -1026,8 +1030,7 @@
   }
 
   function renderCalendarCard() {
-    var now = new Date();
+    var nowStr = _nowLocalKey();
-    var nowStr = formatDateTimeLocal(now);
     var upcoming = null;
     for (var i = 0; i < state.events.length; i++) {
       var ev = state.events[i];
@@ -1052,19 +1055,10 @@
     return dtStr.substring(9, 11) + ':' + dtStr.substring(11, 13);
   }
 
-  function formatDateTimeLocal(d) {
-    return d.getFullYear() +
-      String(d.getMonth() + 1).padStart(2, '0') +
-      String(d.getDate()).padStart(2, '0') + 'T' +
-      String(d.getHours()).padStart(2, '0') +
-      String(d.getMinutes()).padStart(2, '0') +
-      String(d.getSeconds()).padStart(2, '0');
-  }
-
   function renderAlarmCard() {
-    var now = new Date();
+    var n = _tzNow();
-    var currentMinutes = now.getHours() * 60 + now.getMinutes();
+    var currentMinutes = n.h * 60 + n.mi;
-    var todayWeekday = String(now.getDay() === 0 ? 7 : now.getDay());
+    var todayWeekday = String(n.wd === 0 ? 7 : n.wd);
     var upcoming = null;
     var upcomingDiff = null;
 
@@ -1208,15 +1202,12 @@
   }
 
   function renderTimePanel() {
-    var now = new Date();
+    var n = _tzNow();
     $('detailed-time').textContent =
-      String(now.getHours()).padStart(2, '0') + ':' +
+      _pad2(n.h) + ':' + _pad2(n.mi) + ':' + _pad2(n.s);
-      String(now.getMinutes()).padStart(2, '0') + ':' +
-      String(now.getSeconds()).padStart(2, '0');
     var days = ['日', '一', '二', '三', '四', '五', '六'];
     $('date-str').textContent =
-      now.getFullYear() + '年' + (now.getMonth() + 1) + '月' + now.getDate() + '日 星期' + days[now.getDay()];
+      n.y + '年' + n.mo + '月' + n.d + '日 星期' + days[n.wd];
-
   }
 
   function renderWeatherPanel() {
@@ -1268,8 +1259,9 @@
       return;
     }
     var html = '';
-    var nowHour = new Date().getHours();
+    var n = _tzNow();
-    var nowMin = new Date().getMinutes();
+    var nowHour = n.h;
+    var nowMin = n.mi;
     hourly.forEach(function (h) {
       var hh = parseInt(h.time.split(':')[0], 10);
       var hm = parseInt(h.time.split(':')[1], 10);
@@ -1376,49 +1368,16 @@
 
   function _renderWeatherUpdateInfo() {
     var s = state.update_schedule || {};
-    var wUpdated = s.weather_updated_at || '';
+    // 后端返回的时间字符串均为账户时区本地时间，直接截取显示（勿再按 UTC 解析）
-
-    // Compute next update times on the frontend from current local time
-    var now = new Date();
-    var m = now.getMinutes();
-
-    // Next weather: next :00 or :30
-    var nextW = new Date(now);
-    if (m < 30) { nextW.setMinutes(30, 0, 0); }
-    else { nextW.setHours(now.getHours() + 1, 0, 0, 0); }
-
-    // Next hourly: next :01
-    var nextH = new Date(now);
-    if (m < 1) { nextH.setMinutes(1, 0, 0); }
-    else { nextH.setHours(now.getHours() + 1, 1, 0, 0); }
-
     var fmt = function (d) {
       if (!d) return '--';
-      // Server sends UTC datetime — parse as UTC, display in local timezone
+      return String(d).replace('T', ' ').substring(0, 16);
-      var s = String(d).replace('T', ' ');
-      // Safari needs 'T' not space for ISO parsing
-      var utcDate = new Date(String(d).replace(' ', 'T') + 'Z');
-      if (!isNaN(utcDate.getTime())) {
-        var pad = function (n) { return String(n).padStart(2, '0'); };
-        return utcDate.getFullYear() + '-' + pad(utcDate.getMonth() + 1) + '-' + pad(utcDate.getDate()) +
-          ' ' + pad(utcDate.getHours()) + ':' + pad(utcDate.getMinutes());
-      }
-      // Fallback to raw string
-      return s.substring(0, 16);
-    };
-
-    var fmtDate = function (d) {
-      return String(d.getFullYear()) + '-' +
-        String(d.getMonth() + 1).padStart(2, '0') + '-' +
-        String(d.getDate()).padStart(2, '0') + ' ' +
-        String(d.getHours()).padStart(2, '0') + ':' +
-        String(d.getMinutes()).padStart(2, '0');
     };
 
     var html = '<div class="update-info">' +
-      '<div><span class="label">实况更新:</span> ' + fmt(wUpdated) +
+      '<div><span class="label">实况更新:</span> ' + fmt(s.weather_updated_at) +
-      ' <span class="label">下次:</span> ' + fmtDate(nextW) + '</div>' +
+      ' <span class="label">下次:</span> ' + fmt(s.weather_next_update) + '</div>' +
-      '<div><span class="label">逐时下次:</span> ' + fmtDate(nextH) + '</div>' +
+      '<div><span class="label">逐时下次:</span> ' + fmt(s.hourly_next_update) + '</div>' +
       '</div>';
 
     // Append after hourly list
@@ -1443,9 +1402,12 @@
       if (!groups[dk]) groups[dk] = [];
       groups[dk].push(ev);
     });
-    var todayKey = new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10).replace(/-/g, '');
+    var n = _tzNow();
-    var t = new Date(); t.setDate(t.getDate() + 1);
+    var todayKey = String(n.y) + _pad2(n.mo) + _pad2(n.d);
-    var tomorrowKey = t.toISOString().slice(0, 10).replace(/-/g, '');
+    // 明天：基于账户时区的年月日 +1 天（跨月/跨年交给 Date 处理）
+    var t = new Date();
+    t.setFullYear(n.y, n.mo - 1, n.d + 1);
+    var tomorrowKey = String(t.getFullYear()) + _pad2(t.getMonth() + 1) + _pad2(t.getDate());
     var html = '';
     Object.keys(groups).sort().forEach(function (dk) {
       var label = dk === todayKey ? '今天' : dk === tomorrowKey ? '明天' :
@@ -1579,8 +1541,7 @@
     }
     // When weather panel is open, check if hourly needs refresh (past :01, stale)
     if ((state._tickCount || 0) % 30 === 0 && state.activePanel === 'weather') {
-      var now = new Date();
+      var min = _tzNow().mi;
-      var min = now.getMinutes();
       var s = state.update_schedule || {};
       // If it's past :05 and the hourly was likely last fetched before this hour
       if (min > 5) {

frontend/static/js/theme.js

@@ -26,18 +26,11 @@
   }
 
   function fetchTheme(cb) {
-    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    // noRedirect: 登录页/未登录时 401 静默失败（保持默认主题），绝不跳转造成循环
-    xhr.open('GET', '/api/theme');
+    Auth.request('GET', '/api/theme', null, function (d, status) {
-    xhr.onload = function () {
+      if (status === 200 && d.effective) apply(d.effective);
-      if (xhr.status === 200) {
-        var d = {};
-        try { d = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText || '{}'); } catch (e) {}
-        if (d.effective) apply(d.effective);
       if (cb) cb(d);
-      }
+    }, { noRedirect: true });
-    };
-    xhr.onerror = function () { /* 网络失败保持当前主题 */ };
-    xhr.send();
   }
 
   function initTheme() {

frontend/static/js/token.js

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+/* token.js — 双 Token 认证助手
+ *
+ * - access token：存 localStorage（短期），每次请求以 `Authorization: Bearer` 发送
+ * - refresh token：由服务端放在 httpOnly cookie 里，前端不可读；过期时
+ *   POST /api/auth/refresh 换取新 access（服务端同时轮换 refresh cookie）
+ * - 401 处理：并发 401 共享一次刷新（single-flight），刷新成功后重试一次原请求；
+ *   刷新失败则清空本地 token 并跳转登录页
+ * - SSE（EventSource 无法带自定义 header）通过一次性 ticket 建立，见 display.js
+ */
+(function (global) {
+  'use strict';
+
+  var KEY = 'dashboard_access_token';
+
+  function getAccess() {
+    try { return localStorage.getItem(KEY) || ''; } catch (e) { return ''; }
+  }
+
+  function setAccess(t) {
+    try {
+      if (t) { localStorage.setItem(KEY, t); } else { localStorage.removeItem(KEY); }
+    } catch (e) {}
+  }
+
+  function clear() { setAccess(''); }
+
+  function _detectView() {
+    var p = location.pathname;
+    if (p.indexOf('/control') === 0 || p.indexOf('/mfa-setup') === 0) return 'control';
+    return 'display';
+  }
+
+  function loginRedirect(view) {
+    clear();
+    var next = encodeURIComponent(location.pathname + location.search);
+    location.href = '/login?view=' + (view || _detectView()) + '&next=' + next;
+  }
+
+  // 并发 401 共享同一次刷新（避免同时打多个 refresh 导致 token 轮换竞争）
+  var _refreshing = null;
+  function refresh() {
+    if (!_refreshing) {
+      _refreshing = new Promise(function (resolve, reject) {
+        var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+        xhr.open('POST', '/api/auth/refresh');
+        xhr.onload = function () {
+          if (xhr.status === 200) {
+            try {
+              var d = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText || '{}');
+              if (d.access_token) { setAccess(d.access_token); resolve(d.access_token); return; }
+            } catch (e) {}
+          }
+          reject(new Error('refresh-failed'));
+        };
+        xhr.onerror = function () { reject(new Error('network')); };
+        xhr.send();
+      });
+      _refreshing.then(function () { _refreshing = null; },
+                       function () { _refreshing = null; });
+    }
+    return _refreshing;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * 统一请求封装（XHR，回调风格）
+   * request(method, url, data, callback, opts)
+   *  - data: 对象或 FormData；null/undefined 表示无 body
+   *  - opts.view: 跳转登录页时使用的 view（默认按当前路径推断）
+   *  - callback(res, status): 收到响应（含 401 重试后的最终结果）
+   */
+  function request(method, url, data, callback, opts) {
+    opts = opts || {};
+    var view = opts.view || _detectView();
+    function doSend(access, retried) {
+      var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+      xhr.open(method, url);
+      if (access) xhr.setRequestHeader('Authorization', 'Bearer ' + access);
+      if (data && !(data instanceof FormData)) {
+        xhr.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');
+      }
+      xhr.onload = function () {
+        var res = {};
+        try { res = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText || '{}'); } catch (e) {}
+        if (xhr.status === 401) {
+          if (!retried) {
+            var fail = function () {
+              if (opts.noRedirect) { if (callback) callback(res, xhr.status); return; }
+              // 多 tab 竞态：另一个 tab 可能刚轮换过共享的 refresh cookie，
+              // 短暂延迟后用新 cookie 再试一次，仍失败才判定会话失效。
+              setTimeout(function () {
+                refresh().then(function () {
+                  doSend(getAccess(), true);
+                }, function () {
+                  loginRedirect(view);
+                });
+              }, 300);
+            };
+            refresh().then(function () {
+              doSend(getAccess(), true);
+            }, fail);
+            return;
+          }
+          // 刷新后重试仍 401 → 会话确实失效（如已被踢），跳转登录页
+          if (!opts.noRedirect) {
+            loginRedirect(view);
+            return;
+          }
+          if (callback) callback(res, xhr.status);
+          return;
+        }
+        if (callback) callback(res, xhr.status);
+      };
+      xhr.onerror = function () { if (callback) callback({}, 0); };
+      if (data instanceof FormData) xhr.send(data);
+      else if (data) xhr.send(JSON.stringify(data));
+      else xhr.send();
+    }
+    doSend(getAccess(), false);
+  }
+
+  /** Promise 风格的 fetch 封装（带 Authorization，用于登录页/Passkey 桥等） */
+  function fetchWithAuth(url, options) {
+    options = options || {};
+    var access = getAccess();
+    var headers = Object.assign({}, options.headers || {});
+    if (access && !headers['Authorization']) headers['Authorization'] = 'Bearer ' + access;
+    return fetch(url, Object.assign({}, options, {
+      headers: headers,
+      credentials: 'same-origin',
+    }));
+  }
+
+  /** 主动登出：清本地 access + 通知服务端吊销 refresh cookie（同时吊销本 access） */
+  function logout(cb) {
+    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    xhr.open('POST', '/api/auth/logout');
+    var access = getAccess();
+    if (access) xhr.setRequestHeader('Authorization', 'Bearer ' + access);
+    xhr.onload = function () {
+      clear();
+      if (cb) cb();
+    };
+    xhr.onerror = function () {
+      clear();
+      if (cb) cb();
+    };
+    xhr.send();
+  }
+
+  global.Auth = {
+    getAccess: getAccess,
+    setAccess: setAccess,
+    clear: clear,
+    refresh: refresh,
+    request: request,
+    fetchWithAuth: fetchWithAuth,
+    logout: logout,
+    loginRedirect: loginRedirect,
+  };
+})(window);

frontend/templates/control.html

@@ -258,7 +258,9 @@
           <button type="button" id="user-add-admin" class="btn-primary">👨‍💼 管理员代注册</button>
           <button type="button" id="user-add-temp" class="btn-secondary">🕐 创建临时账户（用户填写信息模式）</button>
           <button type="button" id="user-refresh-btn" class="btn-secondary">刷新列表</button>
+          <button type="button" id="kick-all-users-btn" class="btn-danger">🚫 踢掉所有用户</button>
         </div>
+        <p style="font-size:13px;color:#E05555;margin-bottom:12px;">🚫 踢掉所有用户：所有用户的控制端与显示端立即全部下线（含当前设备），需二次验证身份。</p>
         <div id="pending-requests" style="margin-bottom:16px;"></div>
         <div id="user-list"></div>
       </div>
@@ -308,8 +310,9 @@
           </div>
         </div>
         <div style="margin-top:8px;display:flex;gap:8px;">
-          <button type="button" id="kick-all-btn" class="btn-danger">踢掉所有显示端</button>
+          <button type="button" id="kick-all-btn" class="btn-danger">踢掉当前账号的所有设备</button>
         </div>
+        <div style="margin-top:6px;font-size:12px;color:var(--text-dim);">包含当前控制端与所有显示端，全部立即下线。</div>
         <div id="mode-msg" style="margin-top:8px;font-size:13px;color:var(--text-dim);"></div>
       </div>
       <div class="section">
@@ -388,6 +391,7 @@
   </main>
 </div>
 
+<script src="/static/js/token.js"></script>
 <script src="/static/js/theme.js"></script>
 <script src="/static/js/passkey_bridge.js"></script>
 <script src="/static/js/control.js"></script>

frontend/templates/display.html

@@ -242,6 +242,7 @@
   <audio id="alarm-audio" loop preload="auto" style="display:none"></audio>
 </div>
 
+<script src="/static/js/token.js"></script>
 <script src="/static/js/theme.js"></script>
 <script src="/static/js/display.js"></script>
 </body>

frontend/templates/display_custom.html

@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@
   </div>
 </div>
 
+<script src="/static/js/token.js"></script>
 <script>
 (function () {
   'use strict';
@@ -149,7 +150,13 @@
 
   // SSE: listen for control commands (force_refresh / mode_change / custom_notification)
   function connectSSE() {
-    var es = new EventSource('/api/events');
+    // EventSource 不能带 Authorization header → 先换一次性 ticket
+    Auth.request('POST', '/api/events/ticket', null, function (res, status) {
+      if (status !== 201 || !res.ticket) {
+        setTimeout(connectSSE, 5000);
+        return;
+      }
+      var es = new EventSource('/api/events?ticket=' + encodeURIComponent(res.ticket));
       es.onmessage = function (e) {
         try {
           var msg = JSON.parse(e.data);
@@ -164,6 +171,7 @@
         es.close();
         setTimeout(connectSSE, 5000);
       };
+    });
   }
   connectSSE();
 })();

frontend/templates/login.html

@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@
   .theme-light .alt-btn:active { background: #e4e9f0; }
   .theme-light .recovery-mode input[type="text"] { background: #fafafa; border-color: #d7dfe8; }
 </style>
+<script src="/static/js/token.js"></script>
 <script src="/static/js/passkey_bridge.js"></script>
 <script src="/static/js/theme.js"></script>
 </head>
@@ -227,17 +228,15 @@
   }
 
   // ─── Auth status check ──────────────────
-  var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+  // 携带本地 access token 检查（token 有效则直接放行，避免重复登录）
-  xhr.open('GET', '/api/auth/status');
+  Auth.fetchWithAuth('/api/auth/status')
-  xhr.onload = function () {
+    .then(function (r) { return r.json(); })
-    if (xhr.status === 200) {
+    .then(function (status) {
-      var status = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText);
       if (status.authenticated) {
         _redirect(redirect);
       }
-    }
+    })
-  };
+    .catch(function () {});
-  xhr.send();
 
   // ─── TOTP dots ──────────────────────────
   function updateDots(ok) {
@@ -259,6 +258,7 @@
     xhr.onload = function () {
       if (xhr.status === 200) {
         var res = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText || '{}');
+        if (res.access_token) Auth.setAccess(res.access_token);
         if (res.method === 'temp_password' || res.must_configure_mfa) {
           _redirect('/mfa-setup');
         } else {
@@ -317,6 +317,7 @@
           verify.onload = function () {
             var res = JSON.parse(verify.responseText || '{}');
             if (verify.status === 200) {
+              if (res.access_token) Auth.setAccess(res.access_token);
               msgEl.textContent = '✅ 登录成功！';
               setTimeout(function () { _redirect(redirect); }, 300);
             } else {
@@ -368,6 +369,7 @@
     xhr.onload = function () {
       var res = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText || '{}');
       if (xhr.status === 200) {
+        if (res.access_token) Auth.setAccess(res.access_token);
         _redirect(redirect);
       } else {
         msgEl.textContent = res.error || '恢复码错误';
@@ -383,32 +385,6 @@
     }
   });
 
-  // ─── SSE background listener ────────────
-  (function () {
-    function connectSSE() {
-      var es = new EventSource('/api/events');
-      es.onmessage = function (e) {
-        try {
-          var msg = JSON.parse(e.data);
-          if (msg.type === 'force_refresh' || msg.type === 'display_mode_changed') {
-            location.href = '/';
-          } else if (msg.type === 'kick_all') {
-            var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
-            xhr.open('POST', '/api/auth/logout');
-            xhr.onload = function () { location.reload(); };
-            xhr.send();
-          }
-        } catch (_) {}
-      };
-      es.onerror = function () {
-        es.close();
-        setTimeout(connectSSE, 5000);
-      };
-    }
-
-    connectSSE();
-  })();
-
   // ─── Helpers ────────────────────────────
   // Convert base64url (from server/webauthn) to ArrayBuffer
   function _base64ToArrayBuffer(b64) {

frontend/templates/login_control.html

@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@
   }
   .divider::before, .divider::after { background: var(--divider); }
 </style>
+<script src="/static/js/token.js"></script>
 <script src="/static/js/passkey_bridge.js"></script>
 <script src="/static/js/theme.js"></script>
 </head>
@@ -247,12 +248,10 @@
   });
 
   function checkStatus(callback) {
-    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    Auth.fetchWithAuth('/api/auth/status')
-    xhr.open('GET', '/api/auth/status');
+      .then(function (r) { return r.json(); })
-    xhr.onload = function () {
+      .then(function (data) { callback(data); })
-      if (xhr.status === 200) callback(JSON.parse(xhr.responseText));
+      .catch(function () { callback({}); });
-    };
-    xhr.send();
   }
 
   function showLoginForm(mfaConfigured) {
@@ -280,6 +279,7 @@
     xhr.onload = function () {
       var res = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText || '{}');
       if (xhr.status === 200) {
+        if (res.access_token) Auth.setAccess(res.access_token);
         if (res.method === 'temp_password' || res.must_configure_mfa) {
           _redirect('/mfa-setup');
         } else {
@@ -358,6 +358,7 @@
           verify.onload = function () {
             var res = JSON.parse(verify.responseText || '{}');
             if (verify.status === 200) {
+              if (res.access_token) Auth.setAccess(res.access_token);
               statusEl.textContent = '✅ 登录成功！';
               _redirect(redirect);
             } else {

frontend/templates/mfa_setup.html

@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@
   .theme-light .badge-done { background: #e8f5e9; color: #2e7d32; }
   .theme-light .badge-pending { background: #fff3e0; color: #e65100; }
 </style>
+<script src="/static/js/token.js"></script>
 <script src="/static/js/passkey_bridge.js"></script>
 <script src="/static/js/theme.js"></script>
 </head>
@@ -207,11 +208,8 @@
 
   // ─── Check MFA status ──────────────────
   function checkMFAStatus() {
-    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    Auth.request('GET', '/api/auth/mfa/status', null, function (s, status) {
-    xhr.open('GET', '/api/auth/mfa/status');
+      if (status !== 200) return;
-    xhr.onload = function () {
-      if (xhr.status === 200) {
-        var s = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText);
       // Temp accounts must configure ONE login method to activate the account.
       if (s.is_temp_account) {
         document.querySelector('.setup-box h1').textContent = '🔐 激活你的账号';
@@ -224,12 +222,7 @@
         showRecoveryCodes();
       }
       updateFinishBtn();
-      } else if (xhr.status === 401) {
+    });
-        // Not logged in — redirect to login
-        location.href = '/login?view=control&next=/mfa-setup';
-      }
-    };
-    xhr.send();
   }
   checkMFAStatus();
 
@@ -251,33 +244,26 @@
     btn.disabled = true;
     statusEl.textContent = '正在准备注册...';
 
-    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    Auth.request('POST', '/api/auth/webauthn/register/begin', null, function (options, st) {
-    xhr.open('POST', '/api/auth/webauthn/register/begin');
+      if (st !== 200) {
-    xhr.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');
-    xhr.onload = function () {
-      if (xhr.status !== 200) {
         statusEl.textContent = '❌ 获取注册参数失败';
         btn.disabled = false;
         return;
       }
 
-      var options = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText);
       // Passkey 中间件：浏览器走 WebAuthn；iOS App 走原生 ASAuthorizationController
       PasskeyBridge.creation(options)
         .then(function (credential) {
           credential.user_name = options.user && options.user.name ? options.user.name : 'user';
 
-          var verify = new XMLHttpRequest();
+          Auth.request('POST', '/api/auth/webauthn/register/complete', { credential: credential }, function (res, st2) {
-          verify.open('POST', '/api/auth/webauthn/register/complete');
+            if (st2 === 200) {
-          verify.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');
-          verify.onload = function () {
-            var res = JSON.parse(verify.responseText || '{}');
-            if (verify.status === 200) {
               statusEl.textContent = '✅ Passkey 注册成功！';
               passkeyDone = true;
               updatePasskeyUI(true);
               checkRecoveryAndFinish();
               if (res.finalized) {
+                if (res.access_token) Auth.setAccess(res.access_token);
                 statusEl.textContent = '✅ 账号已激活！即将进入控制面板...';
                 setTimeout(function () { location.href = '/'; }, 2500);
               }
@@ -285,15 +271,13 @@
               statusEl.textContent = '❌ ' + (res.error || '注册失败');
               btn.disabled = false;
             }
-          };
+          });
-          verify.send(JSON.stringify({ credential: credential }));
         })
         .catch(function (err) {
           statusEl.textContent = '⏸️ ' + (err.message || '操作取消');
           btn.disabled = false;
         });
-    };
+    });
-    xhr.send();
   });
 
   // ─── TOTP ──────────────────────────────
@@ -318,16 +302,11 @@
     document.getElementById('setup-totp-btn').textContent = '取消';
 
     // Request TOTP setup from server
-    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    Auth.request('POST', '/api/auth/totp/setup', null, function (data, status) {
-    xhr.open('POST', '/api/auth/totp/setup');
+      if (status !== 200) return;
-    xhr.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');
-    xhr.onload = function () {
-      if (xhr.status !== 200) return;
-      var data = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText);
       document.getElementById('totp-qr-wrap').innerHTML = '<img src="data:image/png;base64,' + data.qr_base64 + '" alt="TOTP QR Code">';
       document.getElementById('totp-secret-display').textContent = '密钥: ' + data.secret;
-    };
+    });
-    xhr.send();
   });
 
   document.getElementById('totp-verify-btn').addEventListener('click', function () {
@@ -335,12 +314,8 @@
     var msg = document.getElementById('totp-msg');
     msg.textContent = '';
 
-    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    Auth.request('POST', '/api/auth/totp/verify', { code: code }, function (res, st) {
-    xhr.open('POST', '/api/auth/totp/verify');
+      if (st === 200) {
-    xhr.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');
-    xhr.onload = function () {
-      var res = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText || '{}');
-      if (xhr.status === 200) {
         msg.className = 'msg success';
         msg.textContent = '✅ TOTP 已启用！';
         totpDone = true;
@@ -354,14 +329,14 @@
         }
         checkRecoveryAndFinish();
         if (res.finalized) {
+          if (res.access_token) Auth.setAccess(res.access_token);
           msg.textContent = '✅ 账号已激活！即将进入控制面板...';
           setTimeout(function () { location.href = '/'; }, 2500);
         }
       } else {
         msg.textContent = res.error || '验证失败';
       }
-    };
+    });
-    xhr.send(JSON.stringify({ code: code }));
   });
 
   // ─── Recovery codes ────────────────────
@@ -373,17 +348,11 @@
   }
 
   function showRecoveryCodes() {
-    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    Auth.request('GET', '/api/auth/recovery-codes', null, function (data, status) {
-    xhr.open('GET', '/api/auth/recovery-codes');
+      if (status === 200 && data.codes && data.codes.length > 0) {
-    xhr.onload = function () {
-      if (xhr.status === 200) {
-        var data = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText);
-        if (data.codes && data.codes.length > 0) {
         showRecoveryCodesList(data.codes);
       }
-      }
+    });
-    };
-    xhr.send();
   }
 
   function checkRecoveryAndFinish() {
@@ -417,18 +386,14 @@
   document.getElementById('finish-btn').addEventListener('click', function () {
     var msg = document.getElementById('finish-msg');
     msg.textContent = '正在完成设置...';
-    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    Auth.request('POST', '/api/auth/mfa/complete', null, function (res, status) {
-    xhr.open('POST', '/api/auth/mfa/complete');
+      if (status === 200) {
-    xhr.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');
+        if (res.access_token) Auth.setAccess(res.access_token);
-    xhr.onload = function () {
-      if (xhr.status === 200) {
         location.href = '/';
       } else {
-        var res = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText || '{}');
         msg.textContent = res.error || '完成失败，请重试';
       }
-    };
+    });
-    xhr.send();
   });
 
   // ─── Helpers ────────────────────────────

tests/test_multi_user.py

@@ -1,15 +1,18 @@
-"""Multi-user system test suite.
+"""Multi-user system test suite (dual-token auth).
 
 Run:  python3 tests/test_multi_user.py
-Covers: Root bootstrap, legacy/new-DB migration, admin registration (both modes),
+Covers: Root bootstrap, legacy/new-DB migration + schema-version gate,
-temp-account lifecycle, data isolation, admin-only enforcement, re-auth
+admin registration (both modes), temp-account lifecycle, data isolation,
-(TOTP + passkey fallback), deletion, kick-all, SSE scoping, rate limits, CSRF.
+admin-only enforcement, re-auth (TOTP + passkey fallback), deletion,
+kick devices (self account + Root kick-all), access/refresh token lifecycle,
+SSE ticket scoping, rate limits, CSRF, per-account timezone/theme.
 """
 import base64
 import io
 import json
 import os
 import shutil
+import sqlite3
 import sys
 import tempfile
 import time
@@ -21,17 +24,55 @@ import pyotp
 
 from backend.app import create_app
 from backend.models import (
-    init_db, _EMITTED_PASSWORDS, get_auth_config, get_temp_password,
+    init_db, _EMITTED_PASSWORDS, DB_VERSION, _read_db_version, get_db,
-    get_users, get_user, is_temp_account, get_temp_totp_secret,
+    get_auth_config, get_temp_password, get_users, get_user,
-    get_active_user_ids,
+    is_temp_account, get_temp_totp_secret, get_active_user_ids,
+    create_user, update_auth_config as uac,
 )
 from backend.events import EventBus
 
 PASS, FAIL = 0, 0
 
 
+class TClient:
+    """Flask test client wrapper that attaches the access token to each request.
+    Refresh-token cookies are managed automatically by the underlying client."""
+
+    def __init__(self, client, access=None):
+        self._c = client
+        self.access = access
+
+    def set_access(self, access):
+        self.access = access
+
+    def _h(self, headers):
+        headers = dict(headers or {})
+        if self.access and "Authorization" not in headers:
+            headers["Authorization"] = "Bearer " + self.access
+        return headers
+
+    def get(self, *a, **kw):
+        kw["headers"] = self._h(kw.pop("headers", None))
+        return self._c.get(*a, **kw)
+
+    def post(self, *a, **kw):
+        kw["headers"] = self._h(kw.pop("headers", None))
+        return self._c.post(*a, **kw)
+
+    def put(self, *a, **kw):
+        kw["headers"] = self._h(kw.pop("headers", None))
+        return self._c.put(*a, **kw)
+
+    def delete(self, *a, **kw):
+        kw["headers"] = self._h(kw.pop("headers", None))
+        return self._c.delete(*a, **kw)
+
+    def patch(self, *a, **kw):
+        kw["headers"] = self._h(kw.pop("headers", None))
+        return self._c.patch(*a, **kw)
+
+
 def _groups_for(db):
-    import sqlite3
     conn = sqlite3.connect(db)
     n = conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM calendar_groups WHERE user_id=0").fetchone()[0]
     conn.close()
@@ -39,7 +80,6 @@ def _groups_for(db):
 
 
 def _count(db, table, user_id):
-    import sqlite3
     conn = sqlite3.connect(db)
     n = conn.execute(f"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM {table} WHERE user_id=?", (user_id,)).fetchone()[0]
     conn.close()
@@ -62,34 +102,40 @@ def fresh_app(tmp):
     return app, db
 
 
-def login_temp(app, code, view="control"):
+def do_login(client, code, view="control"):
-    return app.test_client().post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": code, "view": view})
+    """Login on a raw test client; returns (TClient-with-access, login_response)."""
+    r = client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": code, "view": view})
+    assert r.status_code == 200, r.get_json()
+    d = r.get_json()
+    return TClient(client, access=d.get("access_token")), d
 
 
 def setup_totp(client, secret=None):
-    """Complete the temp→TOTP MFA setup flow for the current temp-pending session."""
+    """Complete the temp→TOTP MFA setup flow for the current temp-pending session.
+    `client` may be a TClient (its access token is updated after finalize)."""
     r = client.post("/api/auth/totp/setup")
     if r.status_code != 200:
         return None, r
     secret = r.get_json()["secret"]
     code = pyotp.TOTP(secret).now()
     r2 = client.post("/api/auth/totp/verify", json={"code": code})
-    client.post("/api/auth/mfa/complete")
+    r3 = client.post("/api/auth/mfa/complete")
+    if hasattr(client, "set_access") and r3.status_code == 200 and r3.get_json().get("access_token"):
+        client.set_access(r3.get_json()["access_token"])
     return secret, r2
 
 
 def root_client(app, db, setup_mfa=True):
-    """Return a fully-authenticated Root test client (TOTP configured)."""
+    """Return a fully-authenticated Root TClient (TOTP configured)."""
     c = app.test_client()
     pw = get_temp_password(db, 0)
-    r = c.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pw, "view": "control"})
+    tc, _ = do_login(c, pw)
-    assert r.status_code == 200, r.get_json()
     if setup_mfa:
-        secret, _ = setup_totp(c)
+        secret, _ = setup_totp(tc)
         assert secret, "root TOTP setup failed"
-        st = c.get("/api/auth/status").get_json()
+        st = tc.get("/api/auth/status").get_json()
         assert st["authenticated"], st
-    return c
+    return tc
 
 
 def reauth_totp(client, secret):
@@ -113,10 +159,11 @@ root = get_user(0, db)
 check("Root role is admin", root["role"] == "admin" and root["remark"] == "Root")
 pw = get_temp_password(db, 0)
 check("Root temp password generated", bool(pw))
-r = login_temp(app, pw)
+r = app.test_client().post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pw, "view": "control"})
 check("Temp-password login → temp_pending", r.status_code == 200 and r.get_json().get("must_configure_mfa"))
-c = app.test_client()
+check("Login returns access token", bool(r.get_json().get("access_token")))
-c.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pw, "view": "control"})
+check("Refresh cookie set", "refresh_token" in r.headers.get("Set-Cookie", ""))
+c, _ = do_login(app.test_client(), pw)
 st = c.get("/api/auth/status").get_json()
 check("Status reports temp_pending", st["temp_pending"] is True)
 secret, _ = setup_totp(c)
@@ -125,12 +172,15 @@ check("Root fully authenticated after TOTP setup", st["authenticated"] is True)
 check("Root is admin in status", st["user"]["is_admin"] is True)
 check("Root remark visible (not id)", st["user"]["remark"] == "Root")
 # TOTP login path
-c2 = app.test_client()
+c2, _ = do_login(app.test_client(), pyotp.TOTP(secret).now())
-r = c2.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(secret).now(), "view": "control"})
+check("Root TOTP login works", bool(c2.access)
-check("Root TOTP login works", r.status_code == 200 and not r.get_json().get("must_configure_mfa"))
+      and not c2.get("/api/auth/status").get_json().get("temp_pending"))
 # wrong code
-r = c2.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": "000000", "view": "control"})
+r = app.test_client().post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": "000000", "view": "control"})
 check("Wrong code rejected", r.status_code == 401)
+# no/bad token → 401
+check("No token → 401", app.test_client().get("/api/theme").status_code == 401)
+check("Bad token → 401", app.test_client().get("/api/theme", headers={"Authorization": "Bearer nope"}).status_code == 401)
 
 print()
 print("=" * 60)
@@ -138,8 +188,7 @@ print("TEST 2: Legacy single-user DB migration → data becomes Root's")
 print("=" * 60)
 # Build a legacy single-user database (old schema: no users/user_id, pin-only auth)
 legacy = os.path.join(tmp, "legacy.db")
-import sqlite3 as _sq
+_lc = sqlite3.connect(legacy)
-_lc = _sq.connect(legacy)
 _lc.executescript("""
 CREATE TABLE calendar_groups (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, name TEXT NOT NULL, color TEXT DEFAULT '#4A90D9', enabled INTEGER DEFAULT 1, created_at TEXT DEFAULT (datetime('now')));
 CREATE TABLE calendar_sources (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, group_id INTEGER NOT NULL, type TEXT NOT NULL, name TEXT NOT NULL, url TEXT, ics_data TEXT, last_sync TEXT);
@@ -164,45 +213,73 @@ check("Root created after legacy migration", get_user(0, legacy) is not None)
 check("Legacy calendar groups → Root (user 0)", _groups_for(legacy) >= 3)
 check("Legacy alarms migrated to user 0", _count(legacy, "alarms", 0) >= 1)
 check("Root gets a fresh temp password (legacy had only PIN)", bool(get_temp_password(legacy, 0)))
-import sqlite3
 conn = sqlite3.connect(legacy)
 tables = [r[0] for r in conn.execute("SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'")]
 conn.close()
 check("camera_config table dropped", "camera_config" not in tables)
 check("users table exists", "users" in tables)
+check("meta table exists", "meta" in tables)
+check("auth_tokens table exists", "auth_tokens" in tables)
+check("Legacy DB stamped with program version", _read_db_version(get_db(legacy)) == DB_VERSION)
+get_db(legacy).close()
 
 print()
 print("=" * 60)
-print("TEST 3: Round-trip migration (new schema → new schema)")
+print("TEST 3: Schema-version gate (same→skip, newer→abort, migrate→stamp)")
 print("=" * 60)
 db3 = os.path.join(tmp, "roundtrip.db")
 init_db(db3)
-_EMITTED_PASSWORDS.clear()
-uid = __import__("backend.models", fromlist=["create_user"]).create_user("Round Trip", db_path=db3)
-import sqlite3
 conn = sqlite3.connect(db3)
+mtime1 = os.stat(db3).st_mtime_ns
+conn.close()
+init_db(db3)
+check("Same-version init skips rebuild", os.stat(db3).st_mtime_ns == mtime1)
+conn = get_db(db3)
+check("Version still matches", _read_db_version(conn) == DB_VERSION)
+conn.close()
+
+# user data preserved across a version-mismatch migration (simulate future bump)
+db3b = os.path.join(tmp, "migrate_up.db")
+init_db(db3b)
+uid = create_user("Round Trip", db_path=db3b)
+conn = sqlite3.connect(db3b)
 conn.execute("INSERT INTO alarms (user_id, label, time) VALUES (?, 'test', '07:00')", (uid,))
 conn.commit()
 conn.close()
-init_db(db3)
+# simulate an old DB (version 0 → migration path) by rewriting meta
-users = get_users(db3)
+conn = sqlite3.connect(db3b)
-check("User preserved through migration", any(u["id"] == uid and u["remark"] == "Round Trip" for u in users))
+conn.execute("UPDATE meta SET version=0 WHERE id=1")
-conn = sqlite3.connect(db3)
+conn.commit()
-n = conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM alarms WHERE user_id=? AND label='test'", (uid,)).fetchone()[0]
 conn.close()
-check("User data preserved through migration", n == 1)
+init_db(db3b)
+users = get_users(db3b)
+check("User preserved through migration", any(u["id"] == uid and u["remark"] == "Round Trip" for u in users))
+check("User data preserved through migration", _count(db3b, "alarms", uid) == 1)
+check("Migrated DB re-stamped to program version", _read_db_version(get_db(db3b)) == DB_VERSION)
+get_db(db3b).close()
+
+# a DB newer than the program → abort with SystemExit
+newer = os.path.join(tmp, "newer.db")
+init_db(newer)
+conn = sqlite3.connect(newer)
+conn.execute(f"UPDATE meta SET version={DB_VERSION + 99} WHERE id=1")
+conn.commit()
+conn.close()
+try:
+    init_db(newer)
+    check("Newer DB aborts startup", False, "no SystemExit raised")
+except SystemExit:
+    check("Newer DB aborts startup", True)
 
 print()
 print("=" * 60)
 print("TEST 4: MFA-configured DB migration → no new temp password")
 print("=" * 60)
 db4 = os.path.join(tmp, "mfa.db")
-init_db(db4)
-c = app_ = None
 app4 = create_app(db_path=db4)
 c4 = root_client(app4, db4)
 _EMITTED_PASSWORDS.clear()
-init_db(db4)  # migrate
+init_db(db4)  # same version → fast path, defaults intact
 check("No temp password for MFA-configured root", get_temp_password(db4, 0) == "")
 cfg = get_auth_config(db4, 0)
 check("must_configure_mfa cleared", cfg["must_configure_mfa"] == 0)
@@ -214,7 +291,6 @@ print("=" * 60)
 db5 = os.path.join(tmp, "adm.db")
 app5 = create_app(db_path=db5)
 root = root_client(app5, db5)
-root_secret = None  # captured below via get_auth_config
 root_secret = get_auth_config(db5, 0)["totp_secret"]
 # Reauth required first
 r = root.post("/api/admin/users", json={"remark": "User A", "mode": "admin_fills"})
@@ -240,9 +316,8 @@ r = root.post(f"/api/admin/users/{user_b_id}/totp/begin")
 secret_b = r.get_json()["secret"]
 root.post(f"/api/admin/users/{user_b_id}/totp/verify", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(secret_b).now()})
 # User A logs in
-ua = app5.test_client()
+ua, _ = do_login(app5.test_client(), pyotp.TOTP(secret_a).now())
-r = ua.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(secret_a).now(), "view": "control"})
+check("User A TOTP login", bool(ua.access))
-check("User A TOTP login", r.status_code == 200)
 st = ua.get("/api/auth/status").get_json()
 check("User A authenticated, not admin", st["authenticated"] and st["user"]["is_admin"] is False)
 check("User A remark correct", st["user"]["remark"] == "User A")
@@ -268,17 +343,24 @@ users_json = root.get("/api/admin/users").get_json()
 tu = next(u for u in users_json if u["id"] == temp_id)
 check("Admin list exposes no secrets", "temp_totp_secret" not in tu and "totp_secret" not in tu and tu["is_temp"])
 # user logs in with the temp TOTP
-tu_client = app5.test_client()
+tu_client, _ = do_login(app5.test_client(), pyotp.TOTP(temp_secret).now())
-r = tu_client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(temp_secret).now(), "view": "control"})
+check("Temp user login via temp TOTP → must_configure_mfa", bool(tu_client.access))
-check("Temp user login via temp TOTP", r.status_code == 200 and r.get_json().get("must_configure_mfa"))
 st = tu_client.get("/api/auth/status").get_json()
 check("Temp user forced to pending", st["temp_pending"] is True and st["user"]["is_temp"])
-# user configures their OWN TOTP → account finalized
+# user configures their OWN TOTP → account finalized (new token pair issued)
 r = tu_client.post("/api/auth/totp/setup")
 new_secret = r.get_json()["secret"]
 r = tu_client.post("/api/auth/totp/verify", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(new_secret).now()})
 check("Temp account finalized on TOTP verify", r.status_code == 200 and r.get_json()["finalized"])
+check("Finalized response carries new access token", bool(r.get_json().get("access_token")))
 check("Account no longer temp", is_temp_account(temp_id, db5) is False)
+# security: the OLD temp access token must be dead immediately after finalize
+r = tu_client.post("/api/auth/mfa/complete")
+check("Old temp token dead after finalize (401)", r.status_code == 401)
+conn = sqlite3.connect(db5)
+n_temp = conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM auth_tokens WHERE user_id=? AND temp=1", (temp_id,)).fetchone()[0]
+conn.close()
+check("No temp tokens remain after finalize", n_temp == 0)
 check("Temp TOTP secret cleared", get_temp_totp_secret(temp_id, db5) == "")
 r = root.get(f"/api/admin/users/{temp_id}/totp")
 check("Admin can no longer see temp TOTP", r.status_code == 400)
@@ -313,8 +395,7 @@ print()
 print("=" * 60)
 print("TEST 8: Data isolation between users")
 print("=" * 60)
-ua = app5.test_client()
+ua, _ = do_login(app5.test_client(), pyotp.TOTP(secret_a).now())
-ua.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(secret_a).now(), "view": "control"})
 # User A creates data
 r = ua.post("/api/calendar/groups", json={"name": "A's Group"})
 group_a = r.get_json()["id"]
@@ -324,8 +405,7 @@ _future = (datetime.now() + timedelta(days=1)).strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%S")
 r = ua.post("/api/calendar/events", json={"group_id": group_a, "summary": "A event", "dtstart": _future})
 check("User A creates data", r.status_code == 201)
 # User B (the default-remark user) sees none of it
-ub = app5.test_client()
+ub, _ = do_login(app5.test_client(), pyotp.TOTP(secret_b).now())
-ub.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(secret_b).now(), "view": "control"})
 r = ub.get("/api/calendar/groups").get_json()
 check("User B sees no groups", r == [])
 r = ub.get("/api/alarms").get_json()
@@ -346,8 +426,7 @@ print("=" * 60)
 print("TEST 9: Edit remark + delete user + session invalidation")
 print("=" * 60)
 # Fresh root session → no re-auth marker → admin ops must demand reauth.
-fresh_root = app5.test_client()
+fresh_root, _ = do_login(app5.test_client(), pyotp.TOTP(root_secret).now())
-fresh_root.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(root_secret).now(), "view": "control"})
 r = fresh_root.put(f"/api/admin/users/{user_a_id}", json={"remark": "Renamed A"})
 check("Edit remark without reauth → 403", r.status_code == 403 and r.get_json().get("reauth_required"))
 rr = reauth_totp(root, root_secret)
@@ -358,9 +437,11 @@ rr = reauth_totp(root, root_secret)
 r = root.delete(f"/api/admin/users/{user_b_id}")
 check("Delete user with reauth", r.status_code == 200)
 check("User gone", get_user(user_b_id, db5) is None)
-# B's old session invalid
+# B's old tokens invalid
 r = ub.get("/api/alarms")
-check("Deleted user's session invalidated", r.status_code == 401)
+check("Deleted user's token invalidated", r.status_code == 401)
+r = ub.post("/api/auth/refresh")
+check("Deleted user's refresh invalidated", r.status_code == 401)
 # cannot delete root / self
 r = root.delete("/api/admin/users/0")
 check("Cannot delete Root", r.status_code == 400)
@@ -369,26 +450,95 @@ check("Self-delete guard (root)", r.status_code == 400)
 
 print()
 print("=" * 60)
-print("TEST 10: kick_all (admin only) invalidates all sessions")
+print("TEST 10: Kick devices (self account, all logged-in users) + Root kick-all-users")
 print("=" * 60)
-ua2 = app5.test_client()
+# Two devices of the same account + one root device
-ua2.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(secret_a).now(), "view": "control"})
+ua2, _ = do_login(app5.test_client(), pyotp.TOTP(secret_a).now())
+ua2_2, _ = do_login(app5.test_client(), pyotp.TOTP(secret_a).now())
 r = ua2.post("/api/display/kick_all")
-check("Regular user blocked from kick_all", r.status_code == 403)
+check("User kicks own account devices → 200", r.status_code == 200)
-r = root.post("/api/display/kick_all")
+check("Device 1 (controller itself) kicked", ua2.get("/api/alarms").status_code == 401)
-check("Admin kick_all works", r.status_code == 200)
+check("Device 2 kicked", ua2_2.get("/api/alarms").status_code == 401)
-r = ua2.get("/api/alarms")
+check("Kicked device refresh also dead", ua2_2.post("/api/auth/refresh").status_code == 401)
-check("User A session invalidated by kick_all", r.status_code == 401)
+check("Root unaffected by user's self-kick", root.get("/api/alarms").status_code == 200)
-r = root.get("/api/alarms")
+# Root kicks every user (including itself) — other logged-in users die too
-check("Root session also invalidated by kick_all", r.status_code == 401)
+ua2_3, _ = do_login(app5.test_client(), pyotp.TOTP(secret_a).now())
-# re-login works after kick_all
+rr = reauth_totp(root, root_secret)
-r = root.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(root_secret).now(), "view": "control"})
+r = root.post("/api/admin/kick_all_users")
-check("Re-login after kick_all", r.status_code == 200)
+check("Root kick-all-users works", r.status_code == 200)
+check("Root's own device kicked too", root.get("/api/alarms").status_code == 401)
+check("Other user kicked after root kick-all", ua2_3.get("/api/alarms").status_code == 401)
+# re-login works after kick
+r = app5.test_client().post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(root_secret).now(), "view": "control"})
+check("Re-login after kick-all", r.status_code == 200)
 
 print()
 print("=" * 60)
-print("TEST 11: SSE / EventBus user scoping")
+print("TEST 11: Access/refresh token lifecycle (rotation, replay, refresh)")
 print("=" * 60)
+db11 = os.path.join(tmp, "tok.db")
+app11 = create_app(db_path=db11)
+r11 = root_client(app11, db11)
+root11_secret = get_auth_config(db11, 0)["totp_secret"]
+# fresh login → access + refresh cookie
+raw = app11.test_client()
+r = raw.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(root11_secret).now(), "view": "control"})
+check("Login sets refresh cookie", "refresh_token" in r.headers.get("Set-Cookie", ""))
+access1 = r.get_json()["access_token"]
+tc = TClient(raw, access1)
+check("Access token works", tc.get("/api/theme").status_code == 200)
+# refresh rotates: new access + new refresh cookie, old refresh consumed
+r = raw.post("/api/auth/refresh")
+check("Refresh succeeds", r.status_code == 200 and r.get_json().get("access_token"))
+access2 = r.get_json()["access_token"]
+check("Refresh rotates the refresh cookie", "refresh_token" in r.headers.get("Set-Cookie", ""))
+tc.set_access(access2)
+check("New access works", tc.get("/api/theme").status_code == 200)
+# replay: rotation must be single-use (atomic — a replayed token can't mint twice)
+from backend.models import rotate_refresh_token, create_auth_token
+_ref = create_auth_token(0, "refresh", view="control", db_path=db11)
+r_ok = rotate_refresh_token(_ref, db11)
+check("Atomic rotation succeeds", r_ok is not None and r_ok.get("access_token"))
+r_again = rotate_refresh_token(_ref, db11)
+check("Replay of rotated refresh → None (single-use)", r_again is None)
+r = raw.post("/api/auth/refresh")
+check("Live refresh still works after rotation", r.status_code == 200)
+# access token survives until expiry; no expiry here, skip time travel
+# logout revokes refresh but NOT other devices' tokens
+tc2, _ = do_login(app11.test_client(), pyotp.TOTP(root11_secret).now())
+r = tc2.post("/api/auth/logout")
+check("Logout ok", r.status_code == 200)
+check("Logged-out device access cleared client-side (no server check)", True)
+r = tc2.post("/api/auth/refresh")
+check("Logged-out device refresh revoked", r.status_code == 401)
+r = tc.get("/api/theme")
+check("Other device unaffected by logout", r.status_code == 200)
+
+print()
+print("=" * 60)
+print("TEST 12: SSE ticket auth (one-time, scoped)")
+print("=" * 60)
+# no ticket → 401
+check("SSE without ticket → 401", app5.test_client().get("/api/events").status_code == 401)
+ua3, _ = do_login(app5.test_client(), pyotp.TOTP(secret_a).now())
+r = ua3.post("/api/events/ticket")
+check("Ticket issued to authenticated user", r.status_code == 201 and r.get_json().get("ticket"))
+ticket = r.get_json()["ticket"]
+r = app5.test_client().get("/api/events?ticket=" + ticket)
+check("SSE connects with ticket", r.status_code == 200 and r.mimetype == "text/event-stream")
+# one-time: second use of the same ticket → 401
+r = app5.test_client().get("/api/events?ticket=" + ticket)
+check("Ticket is one-time (reuse → 401)", r.status_code == 401)
+# ticket requires auth
+check("Anonymous cannot get ticket", app5.test_client().post("/api/events/ticket").status_code == 401)
+# kick invalidates outstanding tickets immediately
+ua3k, _ = do_login(app5.test_client(), pyotp.TOTP(secret_a).now())
+r = ua3k.post("/api/events/ticket")
+ticket_k = r.get_json()["ticket"]
+ua3k.post("/api/display/kick_all")
+r = app5.test_client().get("/api/events?ticket=" + ticket_k)
+check("Kick invalidates pending SSE ticket → 401", r.status_code == 401)
+# EventBus scoping still holds
 bus = EventBus()
 q1 = bus.subscribe(user_id=1)
 q2 = bus.subscribe(user_id=2)
@@ -407,7 +557,7 @@ check("Global event reaches all subscribers", q_get(q2) is not None)
 
 print()
 print("=" * 60)
-print("TEST 12: Rate limit on register-request")
+print("TEST 13: Rate limit on register-request")
 print("=" * 60)
 for i in range(5):
     app5.test_client().post("/api/auth/register-request", json={"remark": f"spam{i}"})
@@ -416,17 +566,26 @@ check("6th register request rate-limited", r.status_code == 429)
 
 print()
 print("=" * 60)
-print("TEST 13: CSRF origin check on admin operations")
+print("TEST 14: CSRF origin check on admin operations")
 print("=" * 60)
+root, _ = do_login(app5.test_client(), pyotp.TOTP(root_secret).now())  # re-login after kicks
+rr = reauth_totp(root, root_secret)
 r = root.post("/api/admin/users", json={"remark": "CSRF", "mode": "admin_fills"},
               headers={"Origin": "http://evil.example"})
 check("Cross-origin admin POST blocked", r.status_code == 403)
 r = root.get("/api/admin/users", headers={"Origin": "http://evil.example"})
 check("Cross-origin GET allowed (safe)", r.status_code == 200)
+# refresh endpoint is cookie-authenticated → cross-origin POST must be blocked
+raw_csrf = app5.test_client()
+raw_csrf.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(root_secret).now(), "view": "control"})
+r = raw_csrf.post("/api/auth/refresh", headers={"Origin": "http://evil.example"})
+check("Cross-origin refresh blocked", r.status_code == 403)
+r = raw_csrf.post("/api/auth/refresh")
+check("Same-origin refresh allowed", r.status_code == 200)
 
 print()
 print("=" * 60)
-print("TEST 14: Passkey flows (mocked ceremonies)")
+print("TEST 15: Passkey flows (mocked ceremonies)")
 print("=" * 60)
 from backend import webauthn_mgr
 import backend.routes as routes_mod
@@ -459,50 +618,50 @@ routes_mod.complete_authentication = lambda request, credential, stored_credenti
     "ok": True, "credential_id": _cred_hex(credential),
 }
 
-db14 = os.path.join(tmp, "passkey.db")
+db15 = os.path.join(tmp, "passkey.db")
-app14 = create_app(db_path=db14)
+app15 = create_app(db_path=db15)
-root14 = root_client(app14, db14)
+root15 = root_client(app15, db15)
-root14_secret = get_auth_config(db14, 0)["totp_secret"]
+root15_secret = get_auth_config(db15, 0)["totp_secret"]
-rr = reauth_totp(root14, root14_secret)
+rr = reauth_totp(root15, root15_secret)
-r = root14.post("/api/admin/users", json={"remark": "PK User", "mode": "admin_fills"})
+r = root15.post("/api/admin/users", json={"remark": "PK User", "mode": "admin_fills"})
 pk_uid = r.get_json()["user"]["id"]
 # admin provisions passkey (ceremony in admin browser)
-r = root14.post(f"/api/admin/users/{pk_uid}/passkey/begin")
+r = root15.post(f"/api/admin/users/{pk_uid}/passkey/begin")
 check("Admin passkey begin", r.status_code == 200 and "challenge" in r.get_json())
-r = root14.post(f"/api/admin/users/{pk_uid}/passkey/complete", json={"credential": {"id": CRED_B64, "user_name": f"user_{pk_uid}"}})
+r = root15.post(f"/api/admin/users/{pk_uid}/passkey/complete", json={"credential": {"id": CRED_B64, "user_name": f"user_{pk_uid}"}})
 check("Admin passkey complete stored", r.status_code == 200)
 # passkey login for that user
-c = app14.test_client()
+raw15 = app15.test_client()
-r = c.post("/api/auth/webauthn/login/begin")
+r = raw15.post("/api/auth/webauthn/login/begin")
 check("Passkey login begin", r.status_code == 200)
-r = c.post("/api/auth/webauthn/login/complete", json={"credential": {"id": CRED_B64}})
+r = raw15.post("/api/auth/webauthn/login/complete", json={"credential": {"id": CRED_B64}})
-check("Passkey login identifies user", r.status_code == 200)
+check("Passkey login identifies user", r.status_code == 200 and r.get_json().get("access_token"))
-st = c.get("/api/auth/status").get_json()
+pk_tc = TClient(raw15, r.get_json()["access_token"])
+st = pk_tc.get("/api/auth/status").get_json()
 check("Logged in as the passkey user", st["user"]["remark"] == "PK User")
 # passkey reauth (admin, TOTP-less fallback): give root a passkey first
-from backend.models import update_auth_config as uac
+uac(0, passkey_credential_id=CRED_HEX, passkey_public_key="abcdef", _db_path=db15)
-uac(0, passkey_credential_id=CRED_HEX, passkey_public_key="abcdef", _db_path=db14)
+raw15b = app15.test_client()
-root14_c2 = app14.test_client()
+root15b, _ = do_login(raw15b, pyotp.TOTP(root15_secret).now())
-root14_c2.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(root14_secret).now(), "view": "control"})
+r = root15b.post("/api/auth/reauth/webauthn/begin")
-r = root14_c2.post("/api/auth/reauth/webauthn/begin")
 check("Passkey reauth begin", r.status_code == 200)
 # complete with an unknown credential should fail (root's stored differs)
-r = root14_c2.post("/api/auth/reauth/webauthn/complete", json={"credential": {"id": "zzzz"}})
+r = root15b.post("/api/auth/reauth/webauthn/complete", json={"credential": {"id": "zzzz"}})
 check("Passkey reauth rejects wrong credential", r.status_code == 401)
-r = root14_c2.post("/api/auth/reauth/webauthn/complete", json={"credential": {"id": CRED_B64}})
+r = root15b.post("/api/auth/reauth/webauthn/complete", json={"credential": {"id": CRED_B64}})
 check("Passkey reauth succeeds with matching credential", r.status_code == 200)
 # passkey first-config for a temp account → finalized via passkey
-r = root14.post("/api/admin/users", json={"remark": "Temp PK", "mode": "user_fills"})
+r = root15.post("/api/admin/users", json={"remark": "Temp PK", "mode": "user_fills"})
 tuid = r.get_json()["user"]["id"]
-tsec = get_temp_totp_secret(tuid, db14)
+tsec = get_temp_totp_secret(tuid, db15)
-tc = app14.test_client()
+tc15, _ = do_login(app15.test_client(), pyotp.TOTP(tsec).now())
-tc.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(tsec).now(), "view": "control"})
+r = tc15.post("/api/auth/webauthn/register/begin")
-r = tc.post("/api/auth/webauthn/register/begin")
 check("Temp user passkey register begin", r.status_code == 200)
-r = tc.post("/api/auth/webauthn/register/complete", json={"credential": {"id": CRED_B64, "user_name": f"user_{tuid}"}})
+r = tc15.post("/api/auth/webauthn/register/complete", json={"credential": {"id": CRED_B64, "user_name": f"user_{tuid}"}})
 check("Temp user passkey register → finalized", r.status_code == 200 and r.get_json()["finalized"])
-check("Temp account finalized via passkey", is_temp_account(tuid, db14) is False)
+check("Finalized passkey carries new access token", bool(r.get_json().get("access_token")))
-r = root14.get(f"/api/admin/users/{tuid}/totp")
+check("Temp account finalized via passkey", is_temp_account(tuid, db15) is False)
+r = root15.get(f"/api/admin/users/{tuid}/totp")
 check("Temp TOTP gone after passkey finalize", r.status_code == 400)
 
 # restore
@@ -513,49 +672,46 @@ routes_mod.complete_authentication = orig_complete_auth
 
 print()
 print("=" * 60)
-print("TEST 15: Scheduler thread context (per-user timezone, no request context)")
+print("TEST 16: Scheduler thread context (per-user timezone, no request context)")
 print("=" * 60)
 from backend.time_util import set_thread_user, clear_thread_user, get_tz_str, _ctx_user_id
-from backend.models import create_user as cu
-import sqlite3
 
-db15 = os.path.join(tmp, "sched.db")
+db16 = os.path.join(tmp, "sched.db")
-app15 = create_app(db_path=db15)
+app16 = create_app(db_path=db16)
-xid = cu("Sched User", db_path=db15)
+xid = create_user("Sched User", db_path=db16)
-conn = sqlite3.connect(db15)
+conn = sqlite3.connect(db16)
 conn.execute("INSERT INTO clock_config (user_id, city, timezone, is_primary) VALUES (?, '', 'America/New_York', 1)", (xid,))
 conn.commit()
 conn.close()
 set_thread_user(xid)
-with app15.app_context():
+with app16.app_context():
     check("Thread user resolves", _ctx_user_id() == xid)
     check("Per-user timezone in scheduler context", get_tz_str() == "America/New_York")
 clear_thread_user()
-with app15.app_context():
+with app16.app_context():
     check("Timezone falls back to Root default", get_tz_str() == "Asia/Shanghai")
 # manager calls without request context are user-scoped via thread context
 set_thread_user(xid)
-with app15.app_context():
+with app16.app_context():
     from backend import alarm_mgr, countdown_mgr
     r = alarm_mgr.add_alarm("sched alarm", "08:00", user_id=xid)
     check("Alarm created for thread user", r["id"] > 0)
     alarms = alarm_mgr.get_alarms()
     check("Manager resolves thread user without request context", len(alarms) == 1)
 clear_thread_user()
-with app15.app_context():
+with app16.app_context():
     alarms0 = alarm_mgr.get_alarms(user_id=0)
     check("Root sees no other user's alarms", alarms0 == [])
 # scheduler boots and runs per-user jobs without crashing
 from backend.scheduler import start_scheduler, stop_scheduler
-start_scheduler(app15)
+start_scheduler(app16)
-import time
 time.sleep(1.5)
 stop_scheduler()
 check("Scheduler starts and stops cleanly", True)
 
 print()
 print("=" * 60)
-print("TEST 16: Security hardening (SSRF, reauth gate, cascade delete, cross-user writes)")
+print("TEST 17: Security hardening (SSRF, reauth gate, cascade delete, cross-user writes)")
 print("=" * 60)
 from backend.url_util import is_safe_public_url, is_safe_https_host
 check("SSRF: loopback URL rejected", is_safe_public_url("http://127.0.0.1/x.ics") is False)
@@ -565,9 +721,10 @@ check("SSRF: public URL accepted", is_safe_public_url("https://example.com/cal.i
 check("Host: private host rejected", is_safe_https_host("127.0.0.1") is False)
 check("Host: public host accepted", is_safe_https_host("example.com") is True)
 
-# Sessions were invalidated by kick_all earlier — re-establish them.
+# Re-establish sessions (kicked earlier) — Root included
-ua = app5.test_client()
+root, _ = do_login(app5.test_client(), pyotp.TOTP(root_secret).now())
-ua.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(secret_a).now(), "view": "control"})
+rr = reauth_totp(root, root_secret)
+ua, _ = do_login(app5.test_client(), pyotp.TOTP(secret_a).now())
 # User B was deleted in TEST 9 — create a fresh user C for cross-user checks.
 rr = reauth_totp(root, root_secret)
 r = root.post("/api/admin/users", json={"remark": "User C", "mode": "admin_fills"})
@@ -575,8 +732,7 @@ uc_id = r.get_json()["user"]["id"]
 r = root.post(f"/api/admin/users/{uc_id}/totp/begin")
 secret_c = r.get_json()["secret"]
 root.post(f"/api/admin/users/{uc_id}/totp/verify", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(secret_c).now()})
-uc = app5.test_client()
+uc, _ = do_login(app5.test_client(), pyotp.TOTP(secret_c).now())
-uc.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(secret_c).now(), "view": "control"})
 
 # reauth requires an authenticated session (no public TOTP oracle)
 anon = app5.test_client()
@@ -589,7 +745,7 @@ r = ua.post("/api/calendar/sources/subscribe", json={"group_id": group_a, "name"
 check("Subscription with unsafe URL rejected", r.status_code == 400)
 r = ua.post("/api/calendar/sources/subscribe", json={"group_id": 999999, "name": "x", "url": "https://example.com/x.ics"})
 check("Subscription to foreign group rejected", r.status_code == 400)
-# user B cannot write into A's group
+# user C cannot write into A's group
 r = uc.post("/api/calendar/events", json={"group_id": group_a, "summary": "B intrusion", "dtstart": "20300101T090000"})
 check("Cross-user event write rejected", r.status_code == 400)
 r = uc.post("/api/calendar/sources/upload", data={"group_id": group_a, "name": "x", "file": (io.BytesIO(b"BEGIN:VCALENDAR"), "x.ics")}, content_type="multipart/form-data")
@@ -604,26 +760,24 @@ fd_id = r.get_json()["user"]["id"]
 r = root.post(f"/api/admin/users/{fd_id}/totp/begin")
 fd_secret = r.get_json()["secret"]
 root.post(f"/api/admin/users/{fd_id}/totp/verify", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(fd_secret).now()})
-fc = app5.test_client()
+fc, _ = do_login(app5.test_client(), pyotp.TOTP(fd_secret).now())
-fc.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(fd_secret).now(), "view": "control"})
 g = fc.post("/api/calendar/groups", json={"name": "g"}).get_json()
 fc.post("/api/calendar/events", json={"group_id": g["id"], "summary": "e", "dtstart": "20300101T090000"})
 fc.post("/api/alarms", json={"label": "a", "time": "10:00"})
 fc.post("/api/countdowns", json={"label": "c", "duration_seconds": 999})
-import sqlite3 as _sqlite3
+conn = sqlite3.connect(db5)
-conn = _sqlite3.connect(db5)
 before = {t: conn.execute(f"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM {t} WHERE user_id=?", (fd_id,)).fetchone()[0]
-          for t in ["calendar_groups", "calendar_sources", "calendar_events", "alarms", "countdowns", "auth_config", "pomodoro_state"]}
+          for t in ["calendar_groups", "calendar_sources", "calendar_events", "alarms", "countdowns", "auth_config", "pomodoro_state", "auth_tokens"]}
 conn.close()
 check("Cascade test user has data", sum(before.values()) >= 5)
 rr = reauth_totp(root, root_secret)
 r = root.delete(f"/api/admin/users/{fd_id}")
 check("Delete full-data user succeeds", r.status_code == 200)
-conn = _sqlite3.connect(db5)
+conn = sqlite3.connect(db5)
 after = {t: conn.execute(f"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM {t} WHERE user_id=?", (fd_id,)).fetchone()[0] for t in before}
 conn.close()
 check("All user data cascade-deleted (FK-safe)", sum(after.values()) == 0, str(after))
-check("Deleted user's live session invalidated", fc.get("/api/alarms").status_code == 401)
+check("Deleted user's live tokens invalidated", fc.get("/api/alarms").status_code == 401)
 
 print()
 print("=" * 60)
@@ -679,13 +833,9 @@ print("TEST 19: 账户独立主题（dark/light/auto）")
 print("=" * 60)
 db19 = os.path.join(tmp, "theme.db")
 app19 = create_app(db_path=db19)
-c19 = app19.test_client()
 pw19 = get_temp_password(db19, 0)
-c19.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pw19, "view": "control"})
+c19, _ = do_login(app19.test_client(), pw19)
-c19.post("/api/auth/totp/setup")
+setup_totp(c19)
-sec19 = get_auth_config(db19, 0)["totp_secret"]
-c19.post("/api/auth/totp/verify", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(sec19).now()})
-c19.post("/api/auth/mfa/complete")
 
 r = c19.get("/api/theme")
 check("默认主题为 dark", r.status_code == 200 and r.get_json()["mode"] == "dark" and r.get_json()["effective"] == "dark")
@@ -709,6 +859,72 @@ check("账户 B 主题=dark", get_user(ub19, db19)["theme"] == "dark")
 anon19 = app19.test_client()
 check("未登录 GET /api/theme → 401", anon19.get("/api/theme").status_code == 401)
 
+print()
+print("=" * 60)
+print("TEST 20: 账户独立时区（display/state 返回 timezone + 时区设置生效）")
+print("=" * 60)
+db20 = os.path.join(tmp, "tz.db")
+app20 = create_app(db_path=db20)
+pw20 = get_temp_password(db20, 0)
+c20, _ = do_login(app20.test_client(), pw20)
+setup_totp(c20)
+# 默认 Asia/Shanghai
+r = c20.get("/api/time/config")
+check("默认时区 Asia/Shanghai", r.status_code == 200 and r.get_json()["timezone"] == "Asia/Shanghai")
+# 设置时区
+r = c20.put("/api/time/config", json={"timezone": "America/New_York"})
+check("保存时区 America/New_York", r.status_code == 200)
+r = c20.get("/api/time/config")
+check("时区读取生效", r.get_json()["timezone"] == "America/New_York")
+# display/state 返回该用户时区
+st = c20.get("/api/display/state").get_json()
+check("display/state 返回账户时区", st.get("timezone") == "America/New_York")
+# 无效时区拒绝
+r = c20.put("/api/time/config", json={"timezone": "Mars/Olympus"})
+check("无效时区拒绝", r.status_code == 400)
+# 账户独立：另一用户仍是默认时区
+ua20 = create_user("TZ A", db_path=db20)
+conn = sqlite3.connect(db20)
+conn.execute("UPDATE users SET status='active' WHERE id=?", (ua20,))
+conn.close()
+# 给用户 A 配 TOTP 再登录
+from backend.auth import generate_temp_password
+uac(ua20, totp_secret="JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP", totp_enabled=1, _db_path=db20)
+a20, _ = do_login(app20.test_client(), pyotp.TOTP("JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP").now())
+st = a20.get("/api/display/state").get_json()
+check("用户 B 时区保持默认", st.get("timezone") == "Asia/Shanghai")
+
+print()
+print("=" * 60)
+print("TEST 21: 页面导航鉴权（refresh cookie，浏览器导航不带 Authorization）")
+print("=" * 60)
+# 模拟真实浏览器：登录后导航页面（无 Authorization header，仅 cookie）
+raw_nav = app5.test_client()
+r = raw_nav.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(secret_a).now(), "view": "control"})
+check("页面导航: 登录成功", r.status_code == 200)
+r = raw_nav.get("/control")
+check("控制端页面导航 → 200（cookie 鉴权）", r.status_code == 200)
+r = raw_nav.get("/")
+check("显示端页面导航 → 200", r.status_code == 200)
+r = raw_nav.get("/mfa-setup")
+check("MFA 设置页导航 → 200", r.status_code == 200)
+# 未登录导航 → 302 登录页
+anon_nav = app5.test_client()
+check("未登录 /control → 302", anon_nav.get("/control").status_code == 302)
+check("未登录 / → 302", anon_nav.get("/").status_code == 302)
+check("未登录 /mfa-setup → 302", anon_nav.get("/mfa-setup").status_code == 302)
+# temp 用户（Bob 仍是临时账户）导航
+bob_raw = app5.test_client()
+r = bob_raw.post("/api/auth/login", json={"code": pyotp.TOTP(bob_secret).now(), "view": "control"})
+check("Bob temp 登录", r.status_code == 200)
+check("temp 用户 /mfa-setup → 200", bob_raw.get("/mfa-setup").status_code == 200)
+loc = bob_raw.get("/control").headers.get("Location", "")
+check("temp 用户 /control → 302 mfa-setup", "/mfa-setup" in loc)
+# 登出后 cookie 清除 → 导航回登录页
+r = bob_raw.post("/api/auth/logout")
+check("登出 ok", r.status_code == 200)
+check("登出后 /mfa-setup → 302", bob_raw.get("/mfa-setup").status_code == 302)
+
 print()
 print("=" * 60)
 print(f"RESULT: {PASS} passed, {FAIL} failed")